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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article covers real property cases from the Southwestern Re-
porter (Third) volumes 580 through 607 and federal cases during the
same period that the authors believe are noteworthy to the jurisprudence
on the applicable subject.
There were few cases of real significance in this Survey period. One of
the more intriguing was the Texas “Taking Clause” addressed by the
Texas Supreme Court with a near reversal of opinion within the written
decision. In this year, how could the consequences of the COVID-19 pan-
demic be missed? As a harbinger for the future periods, a Texas Attorney
General informal “guidance letter” affected foreclosures statewide. Part-
nership formation conditions were another important topic addressed by
the Texas Supreme Court.
This Article will run the gambit from football players and brown re-
cluse spiders in premises liability to a corporate “shoot-out” at the Fort
Worth Stockyards. But in the more mundane cases, drafting precision
was, again, at the forefront of such litigation.
The courts also examined the nature of the landlord–tenant relation-
ship and the difference between a contract and a lease when it comes to
termination provisions. As in previous years, there were several cases ex-
amining contract formation, the statute of frauds, and the interpretation
of ambiguous conveyances. In one case of particular note, the Texas Su-
preme Court provided the practitioner with an invaluable roadmap to
follow when conducting electronic negotiations. In several other cases,
the Texas Supreme Court examined the parole evidence rule and rein-
forced the importance of ensuring the written contract reflects all mate-
rial terms and conditions. Other important topics addressed include
whether it was appropriate to imply a fixed width to blanket utility ease-
ments and when it was appropriate to dismiss a case for failure to comply
with the certificate of merit statute.
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II. MORTGAGES, FORECLOSURES, AND LIENS
A. NO STRICT REQUIREMENT FOR CURE PERIOD
Casalicchio v. BOKF, N.A.1 involved the issue of strict compliance with
the thirty-day default notice in a residential deed of trust foreclosure. The
facts were simple and undisputed. The lender, following payment defaults
by the borrower, sent a notice of default dated September 5, 2016, but the
notice was not mailed until a week later on September 12, 2016.2 The
applicable deed of trust was clear in its requirement that the notice of
breach must specify “a date, not less than 30 days from the date the no-
tice is given . . . by which the default must be cured.”3 However, the
notice of default instructed Casalicchio to deliver the past-due amount by
October 5, 2016, which gave it less than thirty days to cure from the date
the notice was given. Casalicchio alleged such failure voided the foreclo-
sure sale, likening it to a “skydiver who ‘jump[s] without a parachute.’”4
On the other hand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
noted that the incorrect deadline on the notice of default was immaterial
and had no harmful effect on the borrower because: (1) the borrower
admitted to not having funds sufficient to cure the default within either
the actual stated cure period or the required thirty-day cure period; (2)
the actual acceleration did not occur immediately after the reduced cure
period; and (3) the lender offered other loan modifications on numerous
occasions over the next nine months before acceleration actually oc-
curred.5 The Fifth Circuit held that such a minor defect in an otherwise
valid foreclosure sale did not void the foreclosure, relying on prior Texas
Supreme Court decisions.6 In the first case, University Savings Associa-
tion v. Springwoods Shopping Center, the Texas Supreme Court held that
the requirement to record a notice of appointment of a substitute trustee
would not invalidate the foreclosure when the appointment was recorded
two days after the foreclosure sale but with the debtor having previously
received actual notice of the substitute trustee’s appointment.7 In the sec-
ond case, Jasper Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Reddell, the
Texas Supreme Court held that failure to comply with a deed of trust
provision requiring notice of a right to reinstate and right to bring a court
action to assert defenses to acceleration or foreclosure would not void the
foreclosure sale where, (1) the debtor had actual notice of such rights by
prior consultation with legal counsel, and (2) the notice was “not other-
wise required by law.”8 The Fifth Circuit concluded that any requirement
1. 951 F.3d 672, 672 (5th Cir. 2020).
2. Id. at 674, 674 n.2.
3. Id. at 674.
4. Id. at 676.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 678 (citing Hemyari v. Stephens, 335 S.W.3d 623, 628 (Tex. 2011)).
7. Id. at 677 (citing Univ. Savs. Ass’n v. Springwoods Shopping Ctr., 644 S.W.2d 705,
706 (Tex. 1982)).
8. Id. (citing Jasper Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n v. Reddell, 730 S.W.2d 672, 673–75 (Tex.
1987)).
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of strict compliance with deed of trust provisions was not absolute based
on Hemyari v. Stephens.9 In Hemyari, the deed of trust and substitute
trustee’s deed failed to include the debtors’—two limited partnerships—
actual names, “erroneously naming each partnership’s general partner”
instead.10 Here, the Fifth Circuit approved the supreme court’s holding
that “the mistake was ‘so obvious on its face as to be harmless’”11 and
that the defect was so minor that it would not void the foreclosure sale.12
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, concluded that the
failure to comply with a deed of trust provision, which causes no harm or
prejudice to the debtor, will not void the foreclosure sale.13
B. MECHANIC’S LIEN—EXTINGUISHED BY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Nova Mud, Inc. v. Staley14 involved the interpretation of a settlement
agreement and whether it extinguished a claimed mechanic’s lien. Nova
Mud, Inc. (Nova Mud) performed work at a drilling site for Heritage
Standard Corporation (Heritage).15 There was no payment for the work,
and a mechanic’s lien was asserted by Nova Mud against Heritage.
George Staley (Staley) obtained a coworking interest in the well pursuant
to a farmout agreement with Heritage. Suit to foreclose the mechanic’s
lien was initiated in state court, but the suit was stayed when Heritage
filed a bankruptcy case.16
Eventually, Nova Mud and Heritage entered into a settlement agree-
ment. That settlement agreement specifically provided that “Nova Mud
acknowledges and agrees that its recovery hereunder shall be in full and
final satisfaction of its putative claims and liens against any interests of
Heritage . . . and they shall not assert or enforce any claims and liens
against any such interests.”17 The settlement agreement was approved by
the bankruptcy court, and the automatic stay was lifted, allowing the state
court proceeding to proceed. Ultimately, the state trial court found in its
conclusions of law that “no debt was owed on the invoices, the lien
claimed by Nova Mud had been extinguished, and that because the lien
was extinguished, Nova Mud could not prevail on the claims it asserted
against Staley.”18 Bankruptcy proceedings generally do not affect the lien
against the property, still allowing an in rem recovery against the collat-
eral.19 Nevertheless, the Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals concluded that
Nova Mud elected to proceed with the claim in bankruptcy as opposed to
a foreclosure suit on the mechanic’s lien; in other words, the settlement
9. Id. at 678 (citing Hemyari, 355 S.W.3d at 628).
10. Id. (citing Hemyari, 355 S.W.3d at 628).
11. Id. (quoting Hemyari, 355 S.W.3d at 628).
12. Id. (quoting Hemyari, 355 S.W.3d at 628).
13. Id.
14. 583 S.W.3d 728, 728 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied).
15. Id. at 731.
16. Id. at 732.
17. Id. at 733–34 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 734.
19. Id. at 736 (citing Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 85 (1991)).
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agreement released all of the debt and the accompanying lien.20 There-
fore, Nova Mud lost its right to foreclose the mechanic’s lien claim
against the working interest of Staley.21
C. COVID-19 FORECLOSURES
In an informal guidance letter dated August 1, 2020, from Ryan
Bangert, Deputy First Assistant Attorney General of Texas, to Bryan
Hughes, Texas senator, the effect of state and local orders relating to the
COVID-19 pandemic on judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure sales was ad-
dressed.22 The issue was the effect of the local government’s limit on the
number of attendees at a foreclosure sale pursuant to local emergency
orders.23 This issue arose based on Executive Order GA-28 (Executive
Order), issued by Texas Governor, Greg Abbott, which limited outdoor
gatherings in excess of ten persons unless an exception applied or was
approved by the applicable mayor or county judge.24
Exemptions to the limitation contained in the Executive Order were
specified therein, but Bangert’s letter noted that foreclosure sales did not
fall within any of the exemptions, including, specifically, the exemption
contained in paragraph 1 of the Executive Order.25 That paragraph ex-
empted from capacity limitations “any services listed by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Workforce, Version 3.1.”26 Among those services listed are “real estate
services, including settlement services.”27 Therefore, because a foreclo-
sure sale must be a public sale,28 the possible exclusion of anyone from
the general public would violate the statutory requirements for a proper
foreclosure auction.29 Consequently, without local orders permitting an
unlimited attendance, the Texas Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
believed the statutory requirements could not be satisfied.30
Of course, this is only informal guidance, and it does not carry the au-
thority of a formal opinion of the Texas attorney general. This author is
aware of many lenders’ reluctance to proceed in the face of such “gui-
dance,” but many foreclosure sales are continuing to occur. It is antici-
20. Id. at 738.
21. Id. at 737.
22. Letter from Ryan Bangert, Deputy First Assistant Att’y Gen. of Tex., to Hon.




26. Id. (quoting The Governor of the State of Tex., Relating to the Targeted Response
to the COVID-19 Disaster as Part of the Reopening of Texas, 45 Tex. Reg. 4589 (2020)).
27. Id. (quoting CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY, GUIDANCE
ON THE ESSENTIAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WORKFORCE: ENSURING COMMUNITY
AND NATIONAL RESILIENCE IN COVID-19 RESPONSE, Version 3.1, p. 16 (May 19, 2020),
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Version_3.1_CISA_Guidance_on_Es
sential_Critical_Infrastructure_Workers.pdf) [https://perma.cc/C79L-FEBJ].
28. Id. (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(a)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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pated that future survey periods will provide the opportunity to discuss
cases based on foreclosure sales which occurred during this moratorium
period.31
III. DEBTOR, CREDITOR, GUARANTIES, AND INDEMNITIES
A. DESCRIPTION OF COLLATERAL
In Cheniere Energy, Inc. v. Parallax Enters. LLC,32 the Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals addressed whether a generic description of
collateral was valid for Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) purposes.
Cheniere Energy, Inc. (Cheniere) and Parallax Enterprises LLC (Paral-
lax) had negotiated a potential joint venture agreement to develop liqui-
fied natural gas (LNG) facilities, but those negotiations never resulted in
a final joint venture agreement. During the pendency of negotiations,
Parallax began developing the LNG facilities with money provided by
Cheniere. The nature of this arrangement (equity or debt) was disputed,
but the parties actually signed a promissory note and a security agree-
ment to evidence the advance of funds.33
After advancing $46 million, Cheniere stopped funding and sought
foreclosure of the purported security interest provided by Parallax, being
the equity interest Parallax held in a subsidiary, Live Oak LNG LLC
(Live Oak).34 Parallax filed suit and sought a temporary injunction, which
the trial court granted and which was appealed. The court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court’s grant of the application for a temporary injunc-
tion, but there was a concurring opinion by a single justice and a
dissenting opinion by a single justice.35 The majority concluded that the
security interest in the equity interest in the subsidiary was not ade-
quately described under the UCC.36 The promissory note, which was also
the security agreement, described the collateral as follows:
[a]ll of [Parallax’s] right, title and interest in and to the following . . .
1. All deposit, securities and other accounts and investment
property
2. All instruments, documents and chattel paper
3. All inventory, equipment, fixtures and goods
31. As this Article was submitted for publication, Texas Governor Greg Abbott issued
Executive Order GA-34, which essentially opened up Texas from the COVID-19 shut
down. See The Governor of the State of Tex., Relating to the Opening of Tex. in Response
to the COVID-19 Disaster, 46 Tex. Reg. 1567 (2021). More than likely, this means real
property foreclosures are not generally stalled by the informal guidance of the Texas attor-
ney general. Nevertheless, to perpetuate some uncertainty, Executive Order GA-34 failed
to mention Executive-Order GA-28, which was the lynchpin for the informal guidance
letter. Id. However, the more reasonable interpretation is that, with no restrictions limiting
the size of outdoor gatherings, foreclosures should now be valid. See Letter from Ryan
Bangert, supra note 22.
32. 585 S.W.3d 70, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. dism’d).
33. Id. at 74.
34. Id. at 75.
35. Id. at 86.
36. Id. at 78.
2021] Real Property 223
4. All contracts and permits
5. All letter-of-credit rights
6. All intellectual property
7. All real property
8. All other tangible and intangible property and assets of
[Parallax].37
Parallax’s equity interest in Live Oak was not covered by Items 1–7,
and Item 8 was a “‘super generic’ catch-all that, as a matter of law, ‘does
not reasonably identify the collateral.’”38 Such holding was based on
UCC Section 9.108(c), which provided: “[a] description of collateral as
‘all the debtor’s assets’ or ‘all the debtor’s personal property’ or using
words of similar import does not reasonably identify the collateral.”39 Of-
ficial Comment No. 2 to this section provides that this is a continuation of
the existing case law on the subject.40 However, the UCC official com-
ment does note that, under UCC Section 9-504, a financing statement (as
opposed to a security agreement) is sufficient if it describes collateral as
“all assets or all personal property.”41 Based on the purported collateral
not being appropriately described in the security agreement, the court of
appeals found that there was not an appropriate authenticated security
agreement that provided a description of the collateral42 as required by
UCC Section 9.203(b)(3)(A).43
Cheniere alleged that “intangible property” included the equity inter-
est, as the term “general intangibles” is defined in the UCC.44 The court
of appeals acknowledged that Parallax’s equity interest in Live Oak, as a
general intangible, would have been covered had the listing of collateral
included “general intangibles” but, since it did not, the description was
inadequate.45 To have been deemed adequate, the equity interest needed
to be specifically described or identified by a “type of collateral” defined
in the UCC.46 The court of appeals concluded that the term “intangible
property” was broader than “general intangibles” and thus failed because
of the super-generic description exclusion.47 The court of appeals also
held that the super-generic description was insufficient, despite
Cheniere’s assertion that such collateral was within the intent of the par-
ties, because intent could not substitute for a “description reasonably
identifying the property.”48 Interestingly, the parties had attached an or-
ganizational chart of Parallax to the promissory note, which Cheniere al-
37. Id.
38. Id. (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.108(c)).
39. Id.
40. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 9.108(c) cmt. 2.
41. Id.
42. Cheniere Energy, Inc., 585 S.W.3d at 78–79.
43. Id. at 77 (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 9.203(b)(3)(A)).
44. Id. at 79 (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 9.102(a)(42)).
45. Id. at 79–80.
46. Id. at 79 (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 9.108(b)(3)).
47. Id. at 80.
48. Id.
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leged was sufficient to identify the collateral; however, the language in
the note which referred to the organizational chart did not purport to
describe it as the collateral but merely to identify the corporate
structure.49
As noted above, there was a significant dissent by Chief Justice Frost.
The dissent focused on the issue of whether the term “intangible prop-
erty” qualified as an adequate legal description of the collateral.50 In sup-
port, the dissent reminds us that the specific UCC provision for
descriptions of collateral is written in such a way as to allow for the iden-
tification of that collateral; UCC Section 9.108(a) provides that a descrip-
tion of personal or real property is sufficient “whether or not it is specific,
if it reasonably identifies what is described.”51 The dissent referred to
commentary which had concluded that “[t]he overwhelming majority of
courts uphold very broad descriptions [of collateral under UCC Section
9.203].”52 Furthermore, the dissent recited another provision in the prom-
issory note granting a security interest in the collateral described on an
exhibit which included “any general intangibles at any time evidencing or
relating to any of the foregoing . . . “53 Based on the language in the body
of the security agreement referring to “any general intangibles,” the dis-
sent concluded the collateral description was sufficient.54 Further, the dis-
sent argued that context must drive the meaning because the parties
knew the only collateral owned by Parallax was its equity interest in Live
Oak and such knowledge made the description identifiable.55 Such con-
clusion relied on the UCC Section 9.108, Official Comment No. 2, which
explains both that the purpose of collateral description is evidentiary and
that the so-called serial number test is rejected.56
Unfortunately, this again represents a case of a failure of draftsmanship
where a simple change or addition would have made a significant differ-
ence in this case. Despite this dissenting opinion, prudent drafting of a
security agreement should always contain either very detailed descrip-
tions of the collateral intended or inclusion of all applicable “UCC
categories.”
B. DISSIPATION OF ASSETS
RWI Construction, Inc. v. Comerica Bank57 involved a unique set of
circumstances where Comerica Bank (Comerica) was both a partner and
a lender to Lone Star Opportunities Fund V, LP (Lone Star) and its sub-
sidiaries RWI Construction, Inc. (RWI Construction), RWI Acquisition,
49. Id. at 81.
50. Id. at 89–90 (Frost, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 89 (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.108(a)).
52. Id. at 90 n.11 (quoting U.C.C. § 910 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018)).
53. Id. at 90.
54. Id. at 92.
55. Id. at 91.
56. Id. at 91 n.15 (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.108 cmt. 2).
57. 583 S.W.3d 269, 269 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, no pet.).
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LLC (RWI Acquisition), and RWI Constructions Holdings, LLC (RWI
Holdings), (collectively, the RWI entities). Comerica’s loan to RWI Con-
struction and RWI Acquisition was guaranteed by Lone Star. However,
Comerica was also a limited partner in Lone Star.58 While Comerica was
owed money on its outstanding loan to the RWI entities, Lone Star made
a capital call; Comerica paid its share, but the general partner of Lone
Star failed to pay its share. Comerica’s funds were deposited at Texas
Capital Bank, which had a revolving loan to Lone Star. The vast majority
of Comerica’s capital contributions paid down the Texas Capital Bank
loan, and the balance was distributed to Lone Star’s subsidiary portfolio
companies for their operations and could not be refunded. When Lone
Star later made an additional capital call, Comerica paid its pro rata share
(and again, Lone Star’s general partner failed to pay its pro rata share),
but Comerica filed suit seeking an injunction that would prohibit the ex-
cess proceeds from such capital call (after payment of the existing Texas
Capital Bank loan) from being dissipated, as was done with the prior cap-
ital call excess proceeds.59 The single issue on appeal was whether
Comerica had established “that it would suffer an irreparable injury for
which the remedy at law would be inadequate” and in finding that
Comerica had established such, whether the trial court “abused its discre-
tion in entering the injunction” because of such finding.60 The Fifth Dal-
las Court of Appeals recited the long-standing history of judicial
precedent which “forecloses resort to injunctive relief simply to sequester
a source of funds to satisfy a future judgment.”61 However, the court of
appeals did acknowledge that Comerica had an interest in an $800,000.00
settlement of a receivable, which RWI collected and refused to use to pay
the Comerica debt.62 In this situation, the court of appeals recognized an
exception to the general rule63 because such receivable was “logically and
justifiably connected to Comerica Bank’s breach of contract claim” for
which injunctive relief was sought.64
The issue of Lone Star’s solvency also played into whether an adequate
remedy was available to Comerica. Lone Star claimed that, since the trial
court had not concluded Lone Star was insolvent, Comerica could not
prove insolvency, which would constitute the inadequate remedy re-
quired.65 The court of appeals held that insolvency was not a requirement
to establish a lack of an adequate remedy at law, and that the evidence of
Lone Star’s lack of financial wherewithal (including limited cash re-
sources, the questionable value of assets, and a history of converting and
dissipating Comerica’s collateral) would be sufficient evidence for the
58. Id. at 272.
59. Id. at 272–74.
60. Id. at 272.
61. Id. at 277.
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing Khaledi v. H.K. Glob. Trading, Ltd., 126 S.W.3d 273, 278–79 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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trial court to find an inadequate remedy at law.66
C. NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBT
In Veritex Community. Bank v. Osborne (In re Osborne),67 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit discussed the due diligence require-
ments of a creditor as a condition to asserting the nondischargeability of
debts based on financial misrepresentations. Doctor John Osborne (Os-
borne) formed a new medical practice entity and sought a loan from Ver-
itex Community Bank (Veritex). Personal financial statements were
provided, including a statement that Osborne would notify Veritex “of
any material unfavorable change in his financial condition.”68 The loan
was made to the new entity, and Osborne signed a guaranty. To facilitate
his medical practice, Osborne had the borrowing entity enter into a lease
of medical equipment in the amount of $1 million and Osborne signed a
guaranty of this lease obligation. Within two years, the medical practice
entity defaulted on the medical equipment lease and entered into a settle-
ment agreement but later defaulted on that settlement agreement.69 The
equipment lessor obtained a Pennsylvania judgment by confession in the
amount of over $2 million. Veritex was never informed by Osborne or the
medical practice entity of the execution of the equipment lease, the de-
fault thereunder, or the judgment.
Just prior to the equipment lease judgment, Osborne was working with
Veritex to extend the medical practice loan.70 In connection with that re-
quest, Veritex asked for updated financial statements from Osborne. Fi-
nancial statements were provided reflecting a net worth of over $1.5
million but without deduction for the judgment entered against him in
Pennsylvania. Furthermore, Osborne did not update his previous finan-
cial statement as required by Veritex’s documents.71 There was a personal
meeting regarding the loan extension between a commercial loan officer
for Veritex and Osborne in which Osborne failed to reveal both the de-
fault on the lease and the ensuing judgment regarding that default. Nev-
ertheless, Veritex did obtain a credit report which was dated one week
after the judgment was entered, but such judgment was not reflected in
that credit report. In fact, this credit report showed that Osborne’s credit
score had increased slightly since his previous credit report.72 The loan
extension was granted and closed a few months later in March 2014. In
late April 2014, the medical practice entity filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy, and Osborne filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy shortly thereafter. In
those bankruptcy proceedings, Veritex asked that such debt not be dis-
66. Id. at 278.
67. 951 F.3d 691, 691 (5th Cir. 2020).




72. Id. at 696.
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charged because of materially false written statements submitted to Ver-
itex by Osborne.
[A] debt is exempted from discharge if it was obtained by (1) a writ-
ten statement; (2) that is materially false; (3) respecting the debtor’s
or an insider’s financial condition; (4) on which the creditor whom
the debtor is liable for such credit reasonably relied; and (5) that the
debtor caused to be made and published with the intent to deceive.73
The bankruptcy court found that Veritex did not reasonably rely upon the
financial statements provided by Osborne.74
On the reasonable reliance issue, the Fifth Circuit noted it was a fact
question, which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence by
the creditor.75 The congressional intent for such Bankruptcy Code section
was meant “to target creditors acting in bad faith to prevent debtors from
discharging debts.”76 In one of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit’s prior decisions, it established three factors for consideration: (1)
whether the debtor and creditor had previous business dealings that cre-
ated a trust relationship; (2) whether any “red flags” existed which would
have alerted an ordinarily prudent lender as to potential inaccuracies; and
(3) whether minimal investigations would have revealed the inaccuracy of
the misrepresentations.77 However, other factors might be applicable to a
reasonable reliance test, such as fairness of erroneous financial state-
ments78 and alterations in financial statements.79 Armed with a standard
targeting only bad-faith creditors who ignored red flags, the Fifth Circuit
analyzed the facts in this case.
The Fifth Circuit found that Osborne’s “sense of detachment about his
financial statements” and his failure to update them to reflect the equip-
ment loan guaranty and default did not constitute an intent to deceive
that would override the bankruptcy court’s ruling of non-deceit.80 As for
reasonable reliance, the Fifth Circuit discussed the bankruptcy court’s
findings that Osborne had built up a working relationship with Veritex for
thirteen months and that he also had a reputation as an excellent cardiol-
ogist.81 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit noted that “the bankruptcy court
[had] criticized Veritex for relying on the financial statement” that was
provided in connection with the potential extension of the medical prac-
tice loan “because it was not on Veritex’s own form and was unsigned.”82
73. Id. at 696 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 697 (first citing Coston v. Bank of Malvern (In re Coston), 991 F.2d 257, 259
(5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (per curiam); and then citing Norris v. First Nat’l Bank in Luling
(In re Norris), 70 F.3d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1995)).
76. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 130–31 (1977)).
77. Id. at 697–98 (quoting In re Coston, 991 F.2d at 261).
78. Id. at 698 (citing In re Norris, 70 F.3d at 30).
79. Id. (citing Young v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg (In re Young), 995 F.2d
547, 549 (5th Cir. 1993)).
80. Id. at 700.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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However, the Fifth Circuit noted that Veritex provided evidence that it
had followed “its standard practice in extending the loan” by allowing
clients to provide non-bank forms as financial statements.83
Further disagreeing with the bankruptcy court, the Fifth Circuit dis-
missed unreasonable reliance based on the exclusion of contingent liabili-
ties because the bank knew of, and made, the medical practice loan.84
The Fifth Circuit also dismissed any red flags which could have arisen
from knowledge of the medical practice’s financial struggles and its finan-
cial statements changing to a cash basis.85 Finally, reliance was deemed
reasonable even though the financial statements were seven months old
because Veritex made further inquiries as to the then-current financial
condition of Osborne, which was supported by the then-current credit
report reflecting a slightly increased credit standing.86 Therefore, the
Fifth Circuit found Veritex had exercised the necessary reasonable dili-
gence in evaluating Osborne’s financial condition to meet the Bankruptcy
Code’s reasonable reliance standard for the nondischarge of the debt.87
D. ABANDONMENT OF ACCELERATION
In Pitts v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co.,88 a loan was made in
1994 and went into default in September 2010. An initial acceleration let-
ter was sent on December 17, 2010. In September 2013, after Ocwen
Loan Servicing, LLC (Ocwen) became the new servicer, there were addi-
tional notices sent to the borrower, including various monthly statements
indicating the missed payments but not indicating the full outstanding
principal balance that was due.89 A delinquency notice sent in May 2014
demanded payment of less than the full outstanding principal and inter-
est. In March 2015, a notice of default and intent to accelerate was sent to
the borrower. Finally, on January 26, 2016, an acceleration notice was
sent.90 To stop the foreclosure, Pitts alleged the foreclosure was barred by
the statute of limitations because the foreclosure had not occurred within
four years after the December 17, 2010 acceleration. Conversely, the
creditor alleged that it had taken demonstrable actions which evidenced
an abandonment of acceleration.91
An abandonment of acceleration can take one of at least two forms: (1)
express notice of rescission to the debtor, or (2) conduct consistent with
an abandonment of acceleration.92 There have been numerous cases deal-
83. Id. (citing In re Young, 995 F.2d at 549).
84. Id. at 700–01 (citing Norris v. First Nat’l Bank in Luling (In re Norris), 70 F.3d 27,
30 (5th Cir. 1995)).
85. Id. at 701.
86. Id. at 701–02.
87. Id. at 702.
88. 583 S.W.3d 258, 260 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no pet.).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 261.
92. Id. at 262 (quoting Bracken v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 05-16-01334-CV, 2018
WL 1026268, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 23, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).
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ing with abandonment of acceleration from the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit and six Texas cases. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, in Boren v. U.S. National Bank Ass’n, held by way of an
“Erie guess” that a creditor’s notice to the debtor, which does not seek to
collect the full accelerated balance, would constitute an abandonment of
acceleration, thereby resetting the running of the statute of limitations.93
Five of the six Texas cases have held that subsequent notices requesting
partial payment constituted an abandonment of acceleration.94 However,
the distinguishing factor in the subject case was that subsequent notices
demanded less than the accelerated balance, but none of the notices con-
tained language, as contained in Boren and the five Texas cases, indicat-
ing that the loan would be accelerated if the borrower failed to make the
lesser payments.95 A statement that the loan would be accelerated for
such failure is clearly inconsistent with an earlier acceleration; therefore,
it evidences an objective indication that the prior acceleration has been
abandoned.96 Such failure to include the intent to accelerate language
violates one of the two prongs set forth in Boren.97 In the subject case,
the notice language that the loan was “in foreclosure,” or to that effect,
was inconsistent with an abandonment of acceleration.98 Further, the fact
that a second delinquency notice did not contain language about being
“in foreclosure” did not override the inconsistent position taken in prior
notices.99 Therefore, the inconclusive nature of the notices could not sup-
port a summary judgment.100 This is another case where more precise
drafting would have prevented a lot of legal woes.
E. APPRAISAL FRAUD
Credit Suisse AG v. Claymore Holdings, LLC101 involved a suit among
lenders within a syndicated lending group. All disputes were governed by
New York law, as is typical in most syndicated loan transactions, which is
relevant to those practitioners involved in syndicated transactions in
Texas.102 Claymore Holdings, LLC (Claymore) was one of the lender par-
ticipants in the loan and conditioned its participation on having an appro-
93. Boren v. U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 807 F.3d 99, 105 (5th Cir. 2015).
94. Pitts, 583 S.W.2d at 264–65 (first citing Brannick v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No.
03-17-00308-CV, 2018 WL 5729104 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 2, 2018, no pet. h.) (mem.
op.); then citing Farmehr v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 05-17-00563-CV, 2018 WL
2749634 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 31, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); then citing Bracken, 2018
WL 1026268; then citing Emmert v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, F.S.B., No. 02-17-00119-
CV, 2018 WL 1005002 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 22, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); and
then citing NSL Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 02-16-00397-CV,
2017 WL 3526354 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 17, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).
95. Id. at 265.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 266.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 266–67.
101. 610 S.W.3d 808, 808 (Tex. 2020).
102. Id. at 812.
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priate “Qualified Appraisal.” Credit Suisse AG (Credit Suisse) engaged
and worked with the appraiser, an employee of CBRE, Inc. (CBRE),
who initially returned an appraisal on the subject collateral (the Lake Las
Vegas development) in the amount of $513 million. But “[a]t the behest
of Credit Suisse,” the appraisal value was reworked to show a value be-
tween $511 million and $891 million.103 The definition of Qualified Ap-
praisal required the appraisal to be in accordance with the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, and based
on the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. The ap-
praisal was determined to be inconsistent with such standards because:
(1) discounted cash flows were to an incorrect date; (2) the absorption
period for sale of lots was improperly accelerated; (3) premiums based on
“view” were improperly calculated; (4) golf course revenues were im-
properly reported; (5) investment income was not appropriately sup-
ported; and (6) the appraiser did not act independently.104 A few months
after the loan closing, the real estate bubble of 2008 burst, creating a near
total loss, which generated the subject lawsuit.
The biggest issue related to the trial court’s award of equitable rescis-
sion damages (a New York law concept). At trial, Claymore presented
extensive evidence of actual damages, and the jury awarded $40 million
in damages to Claymore based on the value of the asset promised (based
on the fraudulent appraisal) versus the value of the asset actually re-
ceived (i.e., the property’s true value). But the trial court, under New
York law’s equitable rescissory damages, awarded an additional $211 mil-
lion in damages.105 The Texas Supreme Court, following New York law,
held that the equitable remedy was not justified because actual damages,
even though difficult to ascertain, had actually been presented to the jury
through extensive evidence submitted by Claymore, and an actual dam-
age award was made.106 Therefore, an equitable remedy was not availa-
ble, and the $211 million equitable damages award by the trial court was
reversed.107
But the more important aspect of this case dealt with the supreme
court’s interpretation of the disclaimer provisions in the credit agreement
applicable to the fraudulent inducement or fraudulent misrepresentations
alleged against Credit Suisse by Claymore. Section 8.8 of the credit agree-
ment provided that each lender “independently and without reliance
upon any Agent [e.g., Credit Suisse] . . . made its own credit analysis and
decision . . . independently and without reliance upon . . . any Agent.”108
However, Claymore countered that the predominant provision in the
credit agreement was Section 3.1(H)(vi) requiring, as a condition prece-
dent to making the loan, that the agent (Credit Suisse) “shall have re-
103. Id. at 813–14.
104. Id. at 814.
105. Id. at 817.
106. Id. at 819–20.
107. Id. at 824–25.
108. Id. at 815.
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ceived . . . from the Borrowers . . . a Qualified Appraisal . . . in a form
reasonably acceptable to the Administrative Agent.”109 In construing
New York law, the supreme court noted “that a plaintiff’s contractual
disclaimer of reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations or omissions
is ineffective unless: (1) the disclaimer is made sufficiently specific to the
particular type of fact misrepresented, and (2) the alleged misrepresenta-
tion did not concern facts peculiarly within the defendant’s knowl-
edge.”110 The supreme court determined that the errors in the appraisal
were within the “peculiar knowledge” of Credit Suisse; therefore, the dis-
claimers would not be applicable to bar Credit Suisse’s liability.111
F. TURNOVER ORDER/RECEIVERSHIP
Hamilton Metals, Inc. v. Global Metal Services, Ltd.112 involved the in-
terpretation and application of § 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code (the turnover statute).113 Global Metal Services, LTD.
(Global) obtained a final money judgment on October 2, 2016, against
Hamilton Metals, Inc. (Hamilton) and initiated garnishment proceedings
against PNC Bank. Additionally, Global filed an application for a turno-
ver order and an appointment of a receiver. The trial court appointed the
receiver, vesting it with power to take possession of any nonexempt prop-
erty. After such an order, “but before the trial court ruled on the applica-
tion, the Texas Legislature amended Section 31.002(a)” of the turnover
statute; therefore, there was a change in the statute during the pendency
of the pending application.114 Global’s application listed numerous cate-
gories of generic assets that might be owned and held by Hamilton115 but
did not address whether those assets could or could not be readily at-
tached or levied on by ordinary legal process as required by the then
turnover statute.116 Global did not present any evidence on whether any
assets could be levied on by ordinary legal process. However, after the
May 11, 2017 application was made and before the court ruling on July
25, 2017, the Texas legislature amended, effective June 15, 2017, the turn-
109. Id. at 814.
110. Id. at 825 (first citing Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc.,
987 N.Y.S.2d 299, 304 (2014); and then citing Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman
Sachs Grp., Inc., 980 N.Y.S.2d 21, 28 (2014)).
111. Id. at 825–29.
112. 597 S.W.3d 870, 870 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. filed).
113. Id. at 873–74 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002).
114. Id. at 876.
115. Id. at 879.
116. Id. at 875. The applicable turnover statute at the time the application was filed
read, in relevant part, as follows: “[a] judgment creditor is entitled to . . . injunction or
other means in order . . . to obtain satisfaction on the judgment if the judgment debtor
owns property . . . that: (1) cannot readily be attached or levied on by ordinary legal pro-
cess; and (2) is not exempt from attachment, execution, or seizure for the satisfaction of
liabilities.” Id. (quoting Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3242, 3269 (amended 2017, 2019) (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 31.002)).
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over statute to delete § 31.002(a)(1).117 Hamilton alleged that the statu-
tory requirement in effect at the time of filing of the application had to be
complied with, but the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals disagreed,
noting the unambiguous language of the statute which “applie[d] to the
collection of any judgment, regardless of whether the judgment was en-
tered before, on, or after the effective date of this Act.”118 The court of
appeals also rejected Hamilton’s retroactive application argument, noting
that the legislature “did not provide [language] that the prior version of
the statute would continue in effect and apply to all applications pending
on the statute’s effective date.”119 Therefore, Global’s application did not
need to address the legal process provision of the prior turnover
statute.120
The second arm of the prior (and current) version of the turnover stat-
ute required that the judgment creditor prove that the judgment debtor
owned property for which the turnover order was applicable.121 The anal-
ysis of this issue focused on three types of evidence submitted by Global.
The first was the receivership application which was verified by Global’s
counsel as to her personal knowledge and was true and correct to the best
of her knowledge. However, the listing of assets included only general
categories of property which were held not legally sufficient to support
the conclusion that Hamilton held any such property.122 The next type of
evidence was a group of exhibits attached to Global’s reply to Hamilton’s
objections. Hamilton objected to the late introduction of this evidence as
not being consistent with summary judgment evidence rules under Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 166a, but the court of appeals concluded that
summary judgment evidence deadlines do not apply for evidence sup-
porting an application under the turnover statute.123 One exhibit was a
letter from the attorney for the purchaser of Hamilton’s assets at the
UCC foreclosure sale held by PNC Bank under its secured line of credit.
That letter merely stated that not all of Hamilton’s assets were foreclosed
on by PNC Bank and that other assets existed. Because specific assets
were not stated by the purchaser’s attorney, the court of appeals held
such a letter as legally insufficient to support a finding that Hamilton
owned any such property.124 Another exhibit was an answer from PNC
117. Id. at 876 (citing Act of May 24, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 996, § 1, 2017 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 4026, 4026).
118. Id. (quoting Act of May 24, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 996, § 1, 2017 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 4026, 4026).
119. Id. at 877.
120. Id. at 878 (citing Act of May 24, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 996, § 1, 2017 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 4026, 4026).
121. Id. at 878 (first citing Act of May 24, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 996, § 1, 2017 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 4026, 4026; and then citing Gillet v. ZUPT, LLC, 523 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.)).
122. Id. at 880 (citing Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d
469, 503–04 (Tex. 2019)).
123. Id. (citing Gillet, 523 S.W.3d at 754).
124. Id. at 880–81 (first citing Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 503–04; and then citing
Gillet, 523 S.W.3d at 757).
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Bank under the garnishment action to the effect that PNC Bank “was
unable to definitively determine whether it was indebted to Hamilton at
the time,” which the court of appeals determined was legally insufficient
to support the turnover application.125 Finally, there was an affidavit from
the CEO of Hamilton that included a “Schedule 5” list of assets not sold
in the UCC sale by PNC Bank. But again, the court of appeals found this
evidence legally insufficient because it did not contain an actual state-
ment that Hamilton owned any such assets126 except for ten specific as-
sets, which the court of appeals found were the only sufficient evidence of
Hamilton’s ownership of qualifying assets.127
IV. LANDLORD–TENANT RELATIONSHIP AND LEASES
In Don Haskins, Ltd. v. Xerox Commercia. Solutions, LLC,128 the
Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals examined whether a Temporary Park-
ing Agreement (TPA) signed by the tenant of a building was a lease or a
contract. This case provides an important drafting reminder for practi-
tioners regarding termination clauses and the distinction between how
such clauses operate in leases versus other property-related agreements.
Lease agreements which do not contain a “specific length of duration or
end date are . . . considered to be tenancies at will, or terminable at will
by either party.”129 The TPA in question contained no term, and the land-
lord argued that it was effectively a lease and, therefore, terminable at
will. The tenant argued that, although the TPA amended the lease with
respect to the parking provisions, it was not a lease but a standalone
agreement and, therefore, was not terminable at will. The court of ap-
peals agreed with the tenant, stating that “[a]s a matter of law, a lease is
defined as a grant of an estate in land for a limited term, with conditions
attached.”130 In fact, the Texas Supreme Court has held that a “lease
must contain a ‘granting clause,’ or terms which reflect an intention on
the part of the landowner to transfer an interest in and possession of the
property described.”131
In the case at hand, the TPA lacked a granting clause and simply con-
tained two obligations: (1) to provide alternative parking spaces, and (2)
to restrict adjacent tenants from routing truck traffic through the parking
area.132 In addition, evidence was produced at trial that the original draft
of the TPA contained a clause allowing it to be terminable at will; how-
125. Id. at 881 (citing Gillet, 523 S.W.3d at 757).
126. Id. at 882.
127. Id. at 883 (citing Gillet, 523 S.W.3d at 756).
128. 584 S.W.3d 53, 53 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, pet. denied).
129. Id. at 68 (citing Providence Land Servs., LLC v. Jones, 353 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2011, no pet.)).
130. Id. at 68–70. (first citing Holcombe v. Lorino, 79 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1935); and
then citing Virani v. Syal, 836 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ
denied)).
131. Id. at 69 (citing Vallejo v. Pioneer Oil Co., 744 S.W.2d 12, 14–15 (Tex. 1988) (per
curiam)).
132. Id.
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ever, this clause was not included in the final agreement.133 In the case of
a contract, not a lease, a court will imply a reasonable term if a contract is
silent.134 The court of appeals implied a reasonable term as a term that
was coterminous with the lease, and the landlord was liable for breach of
contract.135
In Tatro v. State,136 the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals ex-
amined the landlord–tenant relationship in the context of a criminal tres-
pass charge. The appellant in the case claimed he was a tenant and not
guilty of criminal trespass. The appellant was dating the daughter of the
owner of the premises with whom he also had three daughters.137 The
appellant’s occupation of the house in many ways was similar to a tenant.
The appellant slept in the house, kept clothes and toiletries there, and
even cooked food in the kitchen. One night, the appellant tried to enter
the house intoxicated. The owner of the house asked the appellant to
leave, and he refused. A person commits criminal trespass “if the person
enters or remains on the property of another, without effective consent,
and the person had notice that the entry was forbidden or received notice
to depart but failed to do so.”138 The Texas Property Code defines a “ten-
ant” as “a person who is authorized by a lease to occupy a dwelling to the
exclusion of others and . . . who is obligated under the lease to pay
rent.”139 “An essential element of . . . tenancy is a right of exclusive pos-
session by the tenant.”140 The person in question is generally considered a
lodger or guest and not a tenant if there is “evidence that the owner cares
for the rooms, retains a key, or resides on the premises as part of hiring
out rooms.”141 In the case at hand, even if there was a lease, the evidence
presented at trial established the tenant was forbidden to be at the house
if he was intoxicated.142 The law is clear that where the terms of a lease
prohibit entry under certain conditions and the tenant had notice of those
conditions, the tenant can be guilty of criminal trespass.143
V. PURCHASER AND SELLER
A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Following the trend in recent years, Copano Energy, LLC v.
133. Id. at 70.
134. See id. (citing Fischer v. CTMI, LLC, 479 S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex. 2016)).
135. Id. at 71–72.
136. 580 S.W.3d 740, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
137. Id. at 742.
138. Id. at 743 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(a)(1), (2)).
139. Id. at 744 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.001(6)).
140. Id. (citing Mallam v. Trans-Texas Airways, 227 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 1949, no writ)).
141. Id. (citing Byrd v. Feilding, 238 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1951, no
writ)).
142. Id. at 745.
143. Id. (citing Munns v. State, 412 S.W.3d 95, 102 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no
pet.)).
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Bujnoch144 is another interesting Texas Supreme Court case examining
the types of electronic communications that can create a contract. Practi-
tioners throughout Texas had their fingers (and toes) crossed in the hope
that the supreme court would settle a current split among the various
courts of appeals regarding what type of “electronic” signatures are suffi-
cient to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds. Various courts of
appeals in Texas have found the following actions both do or do not (de-
pending on the court) comply with the statute of frauds: (1) entering your
name in the e-mail from field;145 (2) sending an e-mail with an automati-
cally generated signature block;146 or (3) typing your name at the end of
the e-mail.147 Unfortunately, this case does not address the electronic sig-
nature issue,148 and, instead, the supreme court relied on other factors to
find that a contract had not been formed.149
In the case at hand, the parties exchanged a series of e-mails about a
new easement.150 The various e-mails covered issues such as the price,
location, and parties. The e-mails were exchanged between the lawyer for
the property owners, Marcus Schwartz, and the Director of Right-of-Way
Services for Copano Energy, LLC (Copano) (the party that wished to
acquire the easement), James Sanford. On January 30, 2013, Sanford e-
mailed Schwartz agreeing to pay Schwartz’s “clients $70.00 per foot for
the second 24-inch line.”151 Sanford typed his name below his message.
Schwartz accepted the offer via e-mail. Schwartz’s secretary then sent an
e-mail to Sanford with a formal amendment to an existing easement in-
corporating the agreed to terms. Sanford responded to the e-mail by stat-
ing “I am fine with these changes” and again typed his name below the
message.152
Following this e-mail exchange, other Copano representatives sent a
different proposal to the property owners which contained prices far be-
low the amount negotiated between Sanford and Schwartz. In response,
Schwartz sent an e-mail to Sanford stating that “THIS IS NOT OUR
DEAL[.] WHAT IS GOING ON?”153 Sanford responded with a long
note assuring Schwartz that it was a mistake and that their deal “still
stands.”154 Ultimately, however, Copano refused to close on the original
deal, and the property owners sued.
144. 593 S.W.3d 721, 721 (Tex. 2020).
145. Bujnoch v. Copano Energy, LLC, 581 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2017) (mem. op.) (citing Khoury v. Tomlinson, 518 S.W.3d 568, 575 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.)), rev’d, 593 S.W.3d 721, 724 (Tex. 2020).
146. Id. (citing Cunningham v. Zurich Am. Inc. Co., 352 S.W.3d 519, 530 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied)).
147. Id.
148. Copano Energy, LLC, 593 S.W.3d at 728 n.6.
149. Id. at 732.
150. Id. at 724.
151. Id. at 725.
152. Id. at 726.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 726–27.
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The trial court granted Copano’s motion for summary judgment on the
basis “that the statute of frauds barred enforcement of any agreement to
purchase the second easement”155 because:
(1) the emails may not be read together to make out a written mem-
orandum, and no single email contained the essential terms of the
agreement; (2) even if the emails may be read together, they omitted
essential terms of the agreement, such as (i) the identity of the par-
ties, and (ii) a description of the easement; (3) the emails contained
“futuristic” language; and (4) the parties did not agree to transact
business by electronic means.156
The Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of Appeals overturned
the trial court’s holding, finding that the elements of the statute of frauds
could be satisfied.157 On the issue of reading the e-mails together, the
court of appeals stated that instruments that are signed may be read to-
gether, and Sanford had signed each of the e-mails.158 Furthermore,
§ 322.007 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code states that “elec-
tronic signatures are legally effective to bind parties”159 provided that an
electronic symbol is used showing one’s “intent to sign.”160 Unfortu-
nately, in Texas, the courts have split on what is required to show your
“intent.”161 In the case at hand, the court of appeals felt that typing the
name was sufficient evidence of intent to be bound.162 Having disposed of
the issue of electronic signature, the court of appeals quickly concluded
that there was sufficient information in the e-mails to also establish the
identity of the parties and the description of the easement163 which was
described in the e-mails to “be ‘an additional 20 feet’ wide [and] . . . ‘con-
tiguous to the first easement.’”164
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals and
overturned the holding.165 The supreme court felt that there was no single
writing or even multiple writings taken together that clearly expressed
the intent of the parties to be bound.166 The supreme court described the
e-mails as essentially a series of communications about a future meeting
to be held and the terms that the party intends to offer at the meeting,
not the terms the party actually offered.167 The supreme court quoted the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in noting that “a writing that
contemplates a contract to be made in the future does not satisfy the
155. Bujnoch v. Copano Energy, LLC, 581 S.W.3d 262, 269 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2017) (mem. op.), rev’d, 593 S.W.3d 721, 724 (Tex. 2020).
156. Id. at 270.
157. Id. at 276.
158. See id. at 272.
159. Id. at 271 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 322.007).
160. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 322.002(8)).
161. Id.
162. See id. at 272.
163. Id. at 273–75.
164. Id. at 274.
165. Copano Energy, LLC v. Bujnoch, 593 S.W.3d 721, 732 (Tex. 2020).
166. Id. at 731–32.
167. Id. at 729.
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requirements of the statute of frauds.”168 The supreme court did not ad-
dress the signature issue because the issue was not argued on appeal.169
Although ultimately the supreme court did not find that a contract ex-
isted,170 the case is yet another reminder to practitioners to be careful in
electronic communications. When read together with the following case,
Chalker, the supreme court appears to be trying to give practitioners
some clear guidance regarding the types of electronic communications a
party can engage in without creating a binding contract. In the case at
hand, it could be argued that Copano “got lucky” in that the supreme
court did not find that a contract had been formed. There were many
strong facts arguing for contract formation. In contrast, the following
case, Chalker, presents a roadmap for practitioners who would prefer to
rely on skill and not luck when engaging in electronic transactions.
B. CONTRACT FORMATION AND WAIVER
In Chalker Energy Partners III, LLC v. Le Norman Operating LLC,171
the Texas Supreme Court reversed the First Houston Court of Appeals,
holding, as a matter of law, that the parties’ exchange of e-mails did not
constitute a definitive agreement.172 In the case at hand, prior to engag-
ing in negotiations to sell assets, the parties entered into a confidentiality
agreement which contained a “No Obligation Clause.” Ultimately, this
clause is the linchpin of the supreme court’s holding. The clause stated:
No Obligation. The Parties hereto understand that unless and until a
definitive agreement has been executed and delivered, no contract or
agreement providing for a transaction between the Parties shall be
deemed to exist and neither Party will be under any legal obligation
of any kind whatsoever with respect to such transaction by virtue of
this or any written or oral expression thereof, except, in the case of
this Agreement, for the matters specially agreed to herein. For pur-
poses of this Agreement, the term “definitive agreement” does not
include an executed letter of intent or any other preliminary written
agreement or offer, unless specifically so designated in writing and
executed by both Parties.173
The parties subsequently exchanged e-mails whereby one of the sellers,
Chalker Energy Partners III, LLC (Chalker), informed the potential pur-
chaser’s principal, David Le Norman (Le Norman), that Chalker and the
other sellers were “on board . . . subject to a mutually agreeable
[purchase-and-sale agreement] (PSA).”174 Shortly after exchanging the e-
mails, which implied that the parties “had a deal,” Chalker, instead, en-
tered into a binding PSA with a different purchaser. Le Norman Operat-
168. Id. (quoting Southmark Corp. v. Life Invs., Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 1988)).
169. Id. at 728 n.6.
170. Id. at 731–32.
171. 595 S.W.3d 668, 668 (Tex. 2020).
172. Id. at 677–78.
173. Id. at 670.
174. Id. at 671.
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ing LLC (LNO) (as the potential purchaser) sued Chalker claiming
Chalker had breached the e-mail agreement between the parties. The
trial court granted the sellers’ motion for summary judgement, conclud-
ing that the parties did not intend to be bound until a definitive PSA was
entered into.175 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was
“a fact issue as to whether the e-mail chain satisfies the definitive-agree-
ment requirement because the e-mails set out the assets to be sold, the
purchase price, a closing day, and ‘other key provisions.’”176 The su-
preme court reversed, holding that the No Obligation Clause was unam-
biguous and prevented there from being an issue of fact.177 The supreme
court felt that holding otherwise would strip no obligation clauses of their
“meaning and utility.”178
This case provides practitioners representing sellers with a textbook ex-
ample of how to freely conduct negotiations without binding oneself in
the process. The supreme court sets out a roadmap to be followed by
practitioners: a no obligation clause combined with an affirmative state-
ment in the confidentiality agreement that the seller had the right to
“conduct the process relating to a possible transaction in any manner it
deems appropriate or change the procedure for conducting that pro-
cess.”179 These safeguards, combined with a provision that provided the
confidentiality agreement would “terminate after one year or on the date
that the parties entered into a further written agreement covering the
confidentiality of the Confidential Information,” allowed the parties to
freely negotiate without fear that they would inadvertently become
bound.180 The supreme court also placed significant emphasis on the fact
that, at every step, the sellers reiterated the intention that the negotia-
tions were subject to a “mutually agreeable PSA.”181
VI. CONSTRUCTION MATTERS
In LaLonde v. Gosnell,182 the Texas Supreme Court concurred with the
Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the certificate-of-
merit statute. In the case at hand, the Gosnell family filed suit in Septem-
ber 2011 for structural damage to their home allegedly caused by the
destabilization of the foundation after a chemical was injected into the
soil by certain defendants.183 After mediation and discovery, the defend-
175. Id. at 672.
176. Id. at 675 (citing Le Norman Operating LLC v. Chalker Energy Partners III, LLC,
547 S.W.3d 27, 42 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017), rev’d, 595 S.W.3d 668, 678 (Tex.
2020)).




181. Id. at 677.
182. 593 S.W.3d 212, 212 (Tex. 2019).
183. Gosnell v. LaLonde, 559 S.W.3d 559, 560 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016) (mem.
op.), aff’d, 593 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2019).
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ants filed a motion to dismiss in January 2015.184 The motion to dismiss
was filed 1,219 days after the suit was first filed.185 The motion to dismiss
was based on the failure of the Gosnells to abide by the certificate-of-
merit statute when they filed their initial suit. The trial court agreed and
dismissed the case.186 The court of appeals reversed the trial court,187 and
the supreme court affirmed the court of appeals.188 The supreme court
found that in the case at hand, the defendants could be considered to
have waived the right to dismissal for failure to file a certificate of merit
when, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendants substan-
tially invoked the judicial process.189 The Texas Supreme Court addressed
this very issue in Crosstex Energy Services., LP v. Pro Plus, Inc.190 In that
case, the supreme court held that there was no one factor that would
result in waiver.191 Courts must look at the totality of the circum-
stances.192 Following Crosstex guidance, the supreme court found in La-
Londe that the court of appeals was correct in its finding that the over
three-year delay in filing for dismissal, the participation in the discovery
process, and the repeated attempts to settle the case informally193 were
all indications that “paint[ ] the picture of defendants who did not intend
to take advantage of their right to dismissal.”194
VII. TITLE, CONVEYANCES, AND RESTRICTIONS
A. CONVEYANCES
Piranha Partners v. Neuhoff concerns the assignment of an overriding
royalty interest (ORI) in minerals.195 A dispute arose regarding “whether
the assignment conveyed the assignor’s interest only in the production
from the identified well, in production from any well drilled on the identi-
fied land, or in all the production under the identified lease.”196 The
Texas Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Amarillo Court of Appeals
and reinstated the trial court’s judgment that the assignment assigned all
of the assignor’s production under the lease and not just the production
under a specific well.197 The facts of the case are straightforward. In 1975,
184. Id. at 561.
185. LaLonde, 593 S.W.3d at 216.
186. Id. at 217.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 229.
189. Id. at 227–28.
190. Id. at 216 (citing Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384,
386, 393–95 (Tex. 2014)).
191. See Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P., 430 S.W.3d at 393 (citing Jernigan v. Langley, 111
S.W.3d 153, 156 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam)).
192. LaLonde, 593 S.W.3d at 220 (first citing In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 494
S.W.3d 708, 713 (Tex. 2016); then citing Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P., 430 S.W.3d at 393;
and then citing Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 591 (Tex. 2008)).
193. Id. at 227–29.
194. Id. at 220, 220 n.26.
195. Piranha Partners v. Neuhoff, 596 S.W.3d 740, 742 (Tex. 2020).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 755.
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Neuhoff Oil & Gas and the Neuhoffs (collectively, Neuhoff) purchased a
two-thirds interest in a mineral lease known as the Puryear Lease. The
lease covered all the minerals under the land known as Section 28. Years
later, Neuhoff sold and assigned its two-thirds interest but reserved a
3.75% ORI in all the production under the Puryear Lease.198 From 1975
to 1999, there was only one well completed in Section 28. This well was
named the Puryear B #1-28 well. In 1999, Neuhoff sold its ORI at auction
to Piranha Partners. After 1999, the operator drilled additional wells in
Section 28 and the operator paid the ORI on the additional wells to Neu-
hoff (not Piranha Partners), believing that Neuhoff had only conveyed
the ORI in the Puryear B #1-28 well. In 2012, the operator obtained title
opinions that said that the ORI for the additional wells was owned by
Piranha Partners. As a result of these opinions, the operator demanded a
refund from Neuhoff.199
The language in question was found in a document entitled “Assign-
ment of Overriding Royalty Interests and Oil and Gas Leases” (Assign-
ment).200 The language in question read as follows:
[Neuhoff Oil] does hereby assign, sell and convey unto [Piranha] . . .
without warranty or covenant of title, express or implied, subject to
the limitations, conditions, reservations and exceptions hereinafter
set forth . . . all of [Neuhoff Oil’s] right, title and interest in and to
the properties described in Exhibit “A” (the “Properties”).
 . . . .
All oil and gas leases, mineral fee properties or other interests, IN-
SOFAR AND ONLY INSOFAR AS set out in Exhibit A . . .
whether said interest consists of leasehold interest, overriding royalty
interest, or both . . . which [interest] shall include any working inter-
est, leasehold rights, overriding royalty interests and reversionary
rights held by [Neuhoff Oil], as of the Effective Date.
. . . .
All presently existing contracts to the extent they are assignable and
to the extent they affect the Leases, including agreements for the sale
or purchase of oil, gas and associated hydrocarbons, division orders,
unit agreements, operating agreements, and all other contracts and
agreements arising from, connected with, or attributable to the pro-
duction therefrom.201
Exhibit A described the lands associated with one specific well, the
“Puryear #1-28,” but it also listed separately the Lease.202 Exhibit A read
as follows:
Lands and Associated Well(s): Puryear #1-28
Wheeler County, Texas
NW/4, Section 28, Block A-3, HG&N Ry Co. Survey
198. Id. at 742.
199. Id. at 743.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 744, 753–54 (emphasis omitted).
202. Id. at 745.
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Oil and Gas Lease(s)/Farmout Agreement(s):
Oil & Gas Lease(s)
Lessor: [the Puryears]
Lessee: Marie Lister
Recorded: Volume 297, Page 818.203
The majority of the supreme court looked at the entirety of the docu-
ment, not just Exhibit A, to hold that the document was unambiguous
and conveyed Neuhoff’s entire interest under the lease, not just its inter-
est in the Puryear well.204 The supreme court found particular support in
language that made reference to the granting of all contracts “to the ex-
tent they affect ‘the Leases’” which it argued would not be necessary if
the conveyance was only of an ORI interest in one particular well.205
Neuhoff and the dissent argued that the supreme court’s interpretation
rendered the references in Exhibit A to the specific well meaningless.206
The majority pointed out that by the dissent’s reasoning, if the supreme
court had given precedence to the reference to the specific well, then it
would have rendered the reference to the lease as meaningless, thereby
“any of the three possible constructions would be impermissible.”207
The authors of this Article think the preceding sentence in this Article
summarizes extremely effectively the flaw in the majority’s argument and
explains succinctly why the agreement is ambiguous. There is no possible
interpretation of the agreement that can harmonize the whole document.
Every interpretation requires ignoring certain parts of the document
which is exactly what the majority ended up doing in its analysis. Al-
though the document was clearly written to have Exhibit A define the
conveyance and Exhibit A was, as the majority admitted, ambiguous,208
the majority bent over backwards to find support for their theory in the
remainder of the document to ultimately conclude that the Assignment,
as a whole, was not ambiguous.209 As the dissent stated: “when compet-
ing interpretations are reasonable, and no context favors one reasonable
interpretation over another, then the contract is ambiguous.”210 If the
majority’s analysis was correct, then Exhibit A would need to have said
nothing more than make reference to the lease agreement. The rest of
Exhibit A was superfluous. Therefore, the authors agree with the compel-
ling dissent which noted that because the Exhibit A description was
clearly ambiguous, a fact with which the majority agreed, it rendered the
document, as a whole, ambiguous, and the case should have been re-
manded for a jury to interpret the parties’ intent.211
203. Id.
204. Id. at 755.
205. Id. at 754.
206. Id. at 754, 756 (Bland, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 754 n.22.
208. Id. at 752.
209. Id. at 755.
210. Id. at 756–57 (Bland, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 759.
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Rahlek, Ltd. v. Wells212 involved the interpretation of an arguably am-
biguous deed. The deed in question conveyed “all and singular the rights
and appurtenances thereto in any wise belonging” to the property.213 The
parties to the dispute agreed that this language was a general conveyance
of the entire mineral estate.214 This general conveyance was subject to an
express reservation that read as follows: “Grantor RESERVES unto itself
and its successors and assigns all current oil and gas production.”215 The
parties’ dispute centered on the specific conveyance that read as follows:
“Grantor CONVEYS unto Grantee and its successors and assigns one-
eighth (1/8) of mineral and royalty on all new production which are
owned by Grantors upon the date of this conveyance.”216
At the time of the conveyance, the two grantors (collectively, Grant-
ors) each owned one-eighth (collectively, one-fourth) of the mineral es-
tate.217 Therefore, the question posed was whether the Grantors
conveyed the entirety of each of their fractional interests or only a frac-
tion of each of their fractional interests.218 A general rule of construction
for deeds is that “[g]enerally, deeds are construed to confer upon the
grantee the greatest estate that the terms of the instrument will allow.”219
In order for a deed to be interpreted as conveying less than the entire
estate, the deed must contain “reservations or exceptions that reduce the
estate conveyed.”220 Furthermore, “[b]oth reservations and exceptions in
deeds must be clear and specific.”221 Courts “will not find ‘reservations
by implication.’”222 The Eleventh Eastland Court of Appeals held that
reading
the specific conveyance as limiting the mineral and royalty interests
being conveyed to only a fractional carveout of the grantors’ collec-
tive one-quarter (1/4) interest, as opposed to the entirety of their
fractional interests . . . would contradict and conflict with the general
conveyance . . . and would render the general conveyance meaning-
less and superfluous.223
Furthermore, to read the specific conveyance as granting a lesser estate
would allow a reservation by implication224 which the Texas Supreme
Court, just recently, specifically refused to permit in its decision in Perry-
man v. Spartan Texas Six Capital Partners, Ltd.225 The only interpretation
212. 587 S.W.3d 57, 57 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. denied).
213. Id. at 65.
214. Id. at 66.
215. Id. at 67.
216. Id. at 66.
217. Id. at 62.
218. Id. at 66.
219. Id. at 64 (citing Lott v. Lott, 370 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1963)).
220. Id. (citing Cockrell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. 1956)).
221. Id. at 65.
222. Id. (citing Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six Capital Partners, Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 110, 119
(Tex. 2018)).
223. Id. at 67.
224. Id.
225. 546 S.W.3d at 119.
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which gives meaning to all portions of the deed is the interpretation that
the specific conveyance of the one-eighth interests was intended to con-
firm “the specific quantity and extent of the grantors’ mineral interest
being conveyed to the grantee through the general conveyance—the en-
tirety of their individual one-eighth interests on new production.”226
In Trial v. Dragon,227 the Texas Supreme Court overturned a summary
judgment holding granted by the Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals
which was based on estoppel by deed. In the case at hand, Leo Trial,
along with several of his siblings, owned real property. In 1983, Leo gifted
his wife, Ruth, with one-half of his one-seventh interest in the property.
Nine years later, in 1992, Leo and his siblings purportedly conveyed the
entirety of the land to the Dragons via separate but identical deeds, none
of which contained Ruth’s signature.228 The deeds contained a fifteen-
year mineral reservation that terminated in 2008. Leo passed away in
1996, and Ruth passed away in 2010. The issue in the case was whether
Ruth’s sons inherited her one-fourteenth interest or whether they were
estopped from claiming the interest because their father had signed the
warranty deed claiming to convey the entire interest.229 The Dragons at-
tempted to make two different arguments to establish their primary claim
to the property: Leo’s sons are subject to (1) the estoppel by deed doc-
trine and (2) the after-acquired title doctrine.230
The doctrine of estoppel by deed developed to stand for the proposi-
tion that “all parties to a deed are bound by the recitals therein, which
operate as an estoppel, working on the interest in the land if it be a deed
of conveyance, and binding both parties and privies; privies in blood,
privies in estate, and privies in law.”231 The Dragons claimed and the
court of appeals found that, because Leo’s sons ultimately inherited from
Leo, they were “privies in blood” and were estopped from claiming an
interest in the property contrary to the deed their father had signed.232
However, because the sons inherited the property from their mother,
who did not sign the deed and who held the one-fourteenth interest as
her sole property, they did not hold the property as Leo’s privies but as
Ruth’s.233 Therefore, the supreme court held that the sons were not es-
topped from claiming their interest in the property.234 The Dragons also
attempted to argue that the property was rightfully theirs via the after-
acquired title doctrine but “because the Trial sons [did] not assert an in-
226. Rahlek, Ltd., 587 S.W.3d at 67.
227. 593 S.W.3d 313, 313 (Tex. 2019).
228. Id. at 315.
229. Id. at 315–16.
230. Id. at 317–18.
231. Id. at 318 (quoting Sauceda v. Kerlin, 164 S.W.3d 892, 915 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2005) (quoting Wallace v. Pruitt, 20 S.W. 728, 728–29 (1892, no writ)),
rev’d, 263 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. 2008)).
232. Id. at 316 (quoting Dragon v. Trial, 568 S.W.3d 160, 168–69 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2017), rev’d, 593 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. 2019)).
233. Id. at 324.
234. Id.
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terest derived from Leo’s grant in the 1992 deed, the after-acquired title
doctrine likewise [did] not apply to divest the Trial sons of their interest
and immediately vest the same in the Dragons.”235
In re Estate of Tatum236 concerned the validity of a deed signed by
some but not all the grantors. The appellee claimed the deed was valid to
convey the interests of the grantors who executed the deed.237 The appel-
lants, who had executed the deed, claimed it was understood that the
signature of all grantors would be required for the deed to be valid.238
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee and held
that the deed was a valid conveyance “against the eight grantors who
signed” it.239 On appeal, the appellee contended that the parole evidence
rule precluded the consideration of extrinsic evidence of the intent of the
grantors.240 The Eleventh Eastland Court of Appeals disagreed, reversed,
and remanded, finding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the deed was conditioned on receipt of all signatures.241 The
court of appeals held that an exception to the parole evidence rule allows
for the admission of evidence to establish an oral condition precedent if it
is not inconsistent with the written terms.242 In the case at hand, the deed
was silent on the issue of whether it was valid unless executed by all par-
ties but, as written, was drafted to convey the entire fee estate and not a
portion.243 Because the deed was drafted to convey all, but not a portion,
of the fee, the authors feel that the court of appeals was correct in revers-
ing the trial court.
Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Cochran Investments, Inc.244 may have
drawn the most attention among the title cases during the Survey period
and it continues to draw debate. The facts of the case are fairly simple.
William England and Medardo Garza owned an east Houston duplex in
equal shares.245 Ownership of the duplex was subject to a deed of trust
held by EMC Mortgage (EMC). England conveyed his one-half interest
in the duplex to Garza in September 2009. An involuntary bankruptcy
proceeding was commenced against England in December 2009. En-
gland’s conveyance of his interest in the duplex was set aside as a fraudu-
lent transfer.246 EMC foreclosed its lien on the duplex in December 2010,
and the duplex was sold at a foreclosure sale to Cochran for approxi-
mately $36,000.00. Cochran sold the duplex to Ayers in June 2011 for
235. Id. at 321.
236. 580 S.W.3d 489, 489 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. denied).
237. Id. at 492.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 493.
241. Id. at 494.
242. Id. at 495 (first citing Baker v. Baker, 183 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. 1944); and then
citing DeClaire v. G & B Mcintosh Family Ltd. P’ship, 260 S.W.3d 34, 45–46 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.)).
243. Id. at 494.
244. 602 S.W.3d 895, 895 (Tex. 2020).
245. Id. at 897.
246. Id. at 898.
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$125,000.00. Cochran and Ayers executed a residential sales contract. The
contract called for a general warranty deed to be delivered at closing and
contained a savings clause which read as follows: “REPRESENTA-
TIONS: All covenants, representations, and warranties in this contract
survive closing. If any representation of Seller in this contract is untrue on
the Closing Date, Seller will be in default.”247
At closing, title was conveyed through a special warranty deed. The
deed’s granting clause stated: “[t]hat Cochran Investments, Inc. . . . has
GRANTED, SOLD AND CONVEYED and by these presents does
hereby GRANT, SELL AND CONVEY unto Grantee, all of that certain
tract of land lying and being situated in Harris County, Texas described as
follows.”248 The granting clause is followed by a description of the prop-
erty. The deed also included a special warranty clause that stated:
Grantor does hereby bind Grantor and Grantor’s successors and as-
signs to WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND, all and singular
the Property, subject to the matters stated herein, unto Grantee and
Grantee’s successors and assigns, against every person whomsoever
lawfully claiming or to claim the same or any party thereof by,
through and under Grantor, but not otherwise.249
Chicago Title issued an Owner’s Policy of Title Insurance pursuant to
which Chicago Title agreed to “pay [Ayers] or take other action if [Ayers]
ha[d] a loss resulting from a covered title risk.”250 Chicago Title was a
party via contractual subrogation after paying the loss to the buyer (i.e.,
the insured). Ayers asserted claims for breach of the implied covenant of
seisin, breach of contract, money had and received, and unjust enrich-
ment. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the covenant of seisin as follows:
A covenant . . . appearing in a warranty deed, stating that the grantor
has an estate, or the right to convey an estate, of the quality and size
that the grantor purports to convey. For the covenant to be valid, the
grantor must have both title and possession at the time of the
grant.251
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals found “that (1) the deed that
conveyed the duplex to Ayers did not imply the covenant of seisin[ ] and
(2) the merger doctrine bars recovery for a breach of contract.”252
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the holding on different grounds.
The supreme court found that the language of the deed limited the gran-
tor’s liability for failures of title to claims asserted by individuals “by,
through, and under” the grantor.253 Because the claim was not “by,
247. Id.
248. Cochran Invs., Inc. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 550 S.W.3d 196, 199–200 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2018), aff’d, 602 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. 2020).
249. Id. at 200.
250. Id.
251. Covenant of Seisin, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
252. Cochran Invs., Inc., 550 S.W.3d at 210.
253. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Cochran Invs., Inc, 602 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Tex. 2020).
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through, or under” the grantor, the grantor was not liable.254 The su-
preme court did agree with the court of appeals on the merger doctrine
finding that the contract merged into the deed such that the breach-of-
contract claim for failure to deliver title did not stand.255 Holding that the
savings clause permits a breach-of-contract claim for the same failure of
title for which the special warranty bars recovery would undo the effect
of that warranty, rendering it meaningless.256 Accordingly, the special
warranty foreclosed Chicago Title’s recovery for breach of contract.257
There is clearly a drafting lesson in this case, both for the contract and
possibly the deed, as appropriate. As a result of poor drafting, the trans-
action suffered a complete failure of consideration, but the seller (i.e., the
grantor) kept the payment for the property. Some commentators have
noted the end result was the same as delivering a quitclaim deed.
Teal Trading & Development., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop-
erty Owners Ass’n258 involved the Declaration of Champee Springs
Ranches Property Owners Association (Declaration) that included a non-
access easement which essentially restricted access to a main entrance
creating a “one-way-in-one-way-out” subdivision. The Declaration pro-
vided, essentially, that the declarant reserved, for the exclusive use of the
declarant and its successors and assigns, a one-foot easement for preclud-
ing and prohibiting access to the property and other nearby roads by ad-
jacent property owners. It reserved one access entrance across the
restrictive easement for the Champee Ranches Subdivision, and no one
else was to be granted access without the consent of the declarant.259 Af-
ter several transfers and a foreclosure, Teal Trading and Development
(Teal Trading) acquired title to the 660-acre tract referred to as the Privi-
lege Creek Tract, which was subject to the Declaration. Teal Trading also
acquired the contiguous 1,173 acres, which were not subject to the Decla-
ration. However, the non-access easement effectively divided the 1,173
acres owned by Teal Trading from the Privilege Creek Tract it ac-
quired.260 The prior owner of the Privilege Creek Tract (Champee
Springs) brought suit to enforce the non-access easement and to prevent
the development of the road crossing the non-access easement. At trial,
Champee Springs sought enforcement of the non-access easement by de-
claratory judgment; Teal Trading denied it was bound by the restriction
and sought a declaratory judgment that the non-access easement was an
unreasonable restriction against alienation and that Champee Springs
had waived its right to enforce the same.261 The trial court, the Fourth
San Antonio Court of Appeals, and the Texas Supreme Court all found in
254. Id.
255. Id. at 908.
256. Id. at 907–08.
257. Id.
258. 593 S.W.3d 324, 324 (Tex. 2020).
259. Id. at 328.
260. Id. at 329.
261. Id.
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favor of Champee Springs.262
Texas has adopted the Restatement of Property as to what constitutes
an unreasonable restraint on alienation which can be summarized as fol-
lows: (1) a disabling restraint (attempt by a conveyance to make a later
conveyance void); (2) a promissory restraint (attempt to cause a later
conveyance to impose contractual liability on a subsequent conveyance,
where liability results from breach of an agreement not to convey); and
(3) forfeiture restraint (attempt to terminate all or part of the interest in
property conveyed).263 There was no direct restraint on alienation by vir-
tue of the non-access easement; the evidence presented at trial showed, at
best, an indirect restraint. An indirect restraint can only be stricken if it
bears some relationship to the evil which the rules prohibiting restraints
on alienation are designed to prevent.264 The Restatement of Property
further provides that indirect restraints are valid unless they lack a ra-
tional justification, an issue on which Teal Trading failed to present any
evidence.265
Ultimately, the judgment that the non-access easement was valid and
enforceable was affirmed based on the fact that negative easements and
restrictive covenants are expressly recognized as valid by the Restate-
ment of Property.266 The supreme court specifically declined to void the
restrictive-access easement on public policy grounds.267
B. EASEMENTS
In Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Lynch,268 the Texas Supreme
Court reversed the decision by the trial court and the Sixth Texarkana
Court of Appeals which had utilized extrinsic evidence to attribute a
width to a blanket utility easement. The easement in question read in part
as follows:
an easement or right-of-way for an electric transmission and distrib-
uting line, consisting of variable numbers of wires, and all necessary
or desirable appurtenances (including towers or poles made of wood,
metal or other materials, telephone and telegraph wires, props and
guys), at or near the location and along the general course now lo-
cated and staked out by the said Company over, across and upon the
following described lands . . . .
Together with the right of ingress and egress over [the Landown-
ers’ predecessors-in-title’s] adjacent lands to or from said right-of-
262. Id. at 339–40.
263. Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n, 432
S.W.3d 381, 396 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied) (first citing Sonny Arnold,
Inc. v. Sentry Sav. Ass’n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 813–15 (Tex. 1982); and then citing RESTATE-
MENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 404 (AM. L. INST. 1940)).
264. Id. at 397 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.5 (AM. L.
INST. 1998)).
265. Id.
266. Teal Trading & Dev., LP, 593 S.W.3d at 328.
267. Id.
268. 595 S.W.3d 678, 678 (Tex. 2020).
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way for the purpose of constructing, reconstructing, inspecting, pa-
trolling, hanging new wires on, maintaining and removing said line
and appurtenances; the right to remove from said lands all trees
(fruit trees excepted) and parts thereof, or other obstructions, which
endanger or may interfere with the efficiency of said line or its ap-
purtenances; and the right of exercising all other rights hereby
granted.269
The supreme court held that the easement in question had no fixed
width, but the utility company’s use of the easement must be “reasonable
and necessary.”270 The supreme court stated that “courts have long been
reluctant to write fixed widths into easements when the parties to the
easements never agreed to a particular width . . . We see no reason to
disturb this Court’s and the courts of appeals’ long-standing treatment of
general easements in Texas.”271
The supreme court further elaborated on its holding by explaining that
“[t]he use of a general easement without a fixed width is a strategic deci-
sion that does not render an easement ambiguous or require a court to
supply the missing term.”272
VIII. HOMESTEAD AND HOME-EQUITY LENDING
A. SUBROGATION DESPITE UNCONSTITUTIONAL LIEN
In Zepeda v. Federal Home Loan Mortage. Corp.,273 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Texas Supreme
Court dealing with subrogation and invalid constitutional home-equity
liens.274 The specific certified question was: “Is a lender entitled to equi-
table subrogation, where it failed to correct a curable constitutional de-
fect in the loan documents under [section] 50 of the Texas
[c]onstitution?”275 The Texas Supreme Court answered “yes.”276
Zepeda obtained a valid homestead loan in 2007 which was paid off
and refinanced with a home-equity loan in 2011. Years later, Zepeda noti-
fied the initial lender (predecessor to Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor-
poration (Federal)) of the constitutional defect in the home-equity-
refinancing loan for failure of the lender to sign an acknowledgement of
the homestead’s fair market value pursuant to Texas constitution, art.
XVI, section 50.277 The original lender failed to cure such defect within
the sixty-day constitutional cure period, and, after the assignment of the
loan to Federal, Federal also failed to timely cure such defect. Zepeda
sued to quiet title to the property claiming the home-equity-refinance
269. Id. at 686.
270. Id. at 680.
271. Id. at 689.
272. Id. at 690.
273. 935 F.3d 296, 296 (5th Cir. 2019).
274. Id. at 298–99.
275. Id. at 301.
276. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Zepeda, 601 S.W.3d 763, 764 (Tex. 2020).
277. Zepeda, 935 F.3d at 300.
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loan was constitutionally invalid, but Freddie Mac asserted equitable sub-
rogation rights.278
First, the supreme court distinguished between equitable subrogation
and contractual subrogation, declining any potential contractual subroga-
tion analysis and focusing solely on equitable subrogation rights.279 The
supreme court reiterated the long-standing, historical Texas protection of
the homestead, but acknowledged that modern day constitutional amend-
ments added additional ways to create a constitutional lien on homestead
property.280 The supreme court acknowledged that current constitutional
framework validated a lien that failed to meet the “litany of exacting
terms and conditions” of the Texas constitution.281 However, the question
presented was not whether Freddie Mac sought to foreclose its home eq-
uity lien but rather the assertion of equitable subrogation rights, which
have been recognized since at least 1890.282
The supreme court reviewed prior cases addressing this equitable sub-
rogation principle. In Texas Land & Loan Co. v. Blalock,283 a lender
failed to comply with existing constitutional prohibitions but had dis-
charged a prior, purchase-money loan which entitled the lender to subro-
gation. The Blalock Texas Supreme Court held that the right to
subrogation became effective upon the payment of the valid prior lien.284
Also, in LaSalle Bank N.A. v. White,285 an invalid agricultural home-eq-
uity loan did not defeat the lender’s right to subrogation for a $260,000.00
purchase-money mortgage paid off with the agricultural home-equity
loan.286 Finally, the Texas Supreme Court rejected Zepeda’s claim that
the enactment of the home-equity constitutional lien provisions de-
stroyed the equitable subrogation rights that have long existed under
Texas law.287
B. APPRAISAL AND DOCUMENT DELIVERY REQUIREMENTS
Melton v. CU Members Mortgage288 involved the appraisal provisions
of the Texas constitution with respect to home equity loans. Melton had
an existing $70,000.00 homestead lien against his home and refinanced
with a $223,648.00 home equity loan. Melton was required to extinguish
the existing lien as a condition to the funding of the new home equity
loan. After closing the new loan and making payments for nearly four
278. Id.
279. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 601 S.W.3d at 765 n.3.
280. Id. at 765–66.
281. Id. at 766.
282. Id.
283. 13 S.W. 12, 12 (Tex. 1890).
284. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 601 S.W.3d at 767 (citing Blalock, 13 S.W. at
13–14).
285. 246 S.W.3d 616, 616 (Tex. 2007) (per curium).
286. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 601 S.W.3d at 767 (citing White, 246 S.W.3d at
618–19).
287. Id. at 768.
288. 586 S.W.3d 26, 26 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. denied).
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years, Melton sued the lender alleging an unconstitutional loan because
the loan amount exceeded the constitutional 80% loan to value require-
ment.289 Melton had signed an Acknowledgment Regarding Fair Market
Value of Homestead Property at the closing, listing the market value of
the homestead at $300,000.00.290 But in his pleadings, Melton took the
position that the appraisal failed to consider various property repairs
needed which would have reduced the value of the property. Melton’s
evidence included a declaration indicating that the appraiser failed to ac-
count for the repairs needed, but it did not contain any further
explanation.291
The trial court excluded this declaration evidence as a “sham affidavit,”
and the Third Austin Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling.292
As explained, the sham affidavit rule prevents a party from “submitting
sworn testimony that materially conflicts with the same witness’s prior
sworn testimony, unless there is a sufficient explanation for the con-
flict.”293 The conflicting evidence was, of course, the acknowledgment of
value which Melton signed at the closing. Because there was no explana-
tion in the declaration of the contradiction in the facts between the docu-
ment signed at closing and the declaration, the court determined it was a
sham affidavit, and upheld the trial court’s exclusion.294
Melton claimed another constitutional violation because he did not re-
ceive copies of all documents executed at closing. He alleged that signa-
tures were missing from the closing documents.295 Melton relied upon
Pelt v. U.S. Bank Trust N.A.,296 which the court construed as holding that
copies of the document signed by the borrower but without the lender’s
signature sufficiently complied with the constitutional requirements.297
Further, Pelt required only copies of the documents without any signa-
tures that complied with the constitutional requirements; however, such
constitutional provision had since been amended to require copies of
signed documents.298 Although the lender did not sign the acknowledge-
ment of value—the only document it was required to sign—such over-
sight was held to have been cured by compliance with the cure provisions
under article XVI, section 50(a)(6)(Q)(x)–(xi) of the Texas
constitution.299






295. Id. at 35.
296. 359 F.3d 764, 764 (5th Cir. 2004).
297. Id. at 768.
298. Melton, 586 S.W.3d at 35 (citing TEX. CONST. art XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(v)).
299. Id. at 35–36.




Houston NFL Holding L.P. v. Ryans300 involved a claim of premises
liability by a former professional football player, DeMeco Ryans, who—
while playing for the Philadelphia Eagles in an away game against the
Houston Texans—ruptured his Achilles tendon in a non-contact injury
that ended his career. Claiming a failure to exercise its duty to maintain a
reasonably safe condition of the playing surface, Ryans alleged premises
liabilities against the Houston Texans based on the condition of the field.
The Texans defended by asserting arbitration under the collective bar-
gaining agreement of the NFL Players Association to which Ryans was
bound.301 The trial court denied that motion, which was appealed.302
While this case focused mostly on the arbitration requirements under the
collective bargaining agreement,303 the important aspect for real estate
practitioners is that in certain cases, premises liabilities can be preempted
by third-party documents. The collective bargaining agreement and the
NFL’s rules regarding playing surface requirements were deemed to be
applicable, which required arbitration as opposed to the state law remedy
for premises liability.304 Therefore, Ryans’s premises liability claim was
preempted by the terms of the arbitration. The court specified that “Ry-
ans’[s] premises-liability claim falls within the scope of . . . the [collective
bargaining agreement] because the claim involves the interpretation and
application of NFL Rules pertaining to the terms and conditions of em-
ployment of NFL players.”305 Practitioners should be alert for any such
third-party documents that might alter provisions of Texas law governing
premises liability.
2. Superseding Criminal Activity
Nguyen v. SXSW Holdings, Inc.306 arose out of the 2014 South by
Southwest Festival in Austin, Texas, where a driver fleeing a police chase
breached a number of roadblocks and barricades and crashed into a pe-
destrian crowd, which killed four people and injured many others. The
injured pedestrians sued the city and the festival organizer for negligence
and premises liability.307
As to the city, the trial court should have dismissed the city based on its
plea in abatement for governmental immunity.308 As to the festival own-
300. 581 S.W.3d 900, 900 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).
301. Id. at 903.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 911.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. 580 S.W.3d 774, 774 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).
307. Id. at 779.
308. Id. at 784.
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ers, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals found that the festival
owners negated the duty element in the various claims of the plaintiffs
(premises liability, nuisance, and general negligence).309 Texas law pro-
vides that a duty of responsibility is negated by criminal acts of a third
party, although such abolition of duty is not absolute.310 The existence of
criminal acts negates duty except when a party knows or has reason to
know of an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm that could affect
the invitee.311 So, a duty can occur under a situation where the “general
danger” is foreseeable, which in a criminal activity context can be proven
with evidence of specific previous crimes on or near the premises. This is
the Timberwalk test.312 Alternatively, duty can occur when the premises
owner or occupier had “actual and direct knowledge” of an “imminent”
criminal activity. This is the Del Lago test.313
In considering the Timberwalk test, the Texas Supreme Court has held
that to negate duty there must be more than just the occurrence of crimi-
nal conduct—it must have been foreseeable.314 The factors for the fore-
seeability analysis include whether: (1) the intervening force causing the
harm was different in kind; (2) the intervening force was extraordinary
rather than normal; and (3) the intervening force was independent.315
Consequently, the supreme court considered whether twenty-three crimi-
nal occurrences presented by the plaintiffs satisfied the Timberwalk
test.316 Each of these separate instances was analyzed under the
Timberwalk factors of proximity, recency, frequency, similarity, and pub-
licity.317 All twenty-three separate instances were found to be inapplica-
ble based upon these factors, so foreseeability was not proven.318
Next, under the Del Lago analysis, the supreme court noted there was
no evidence of any knowledge of imminent criminal conduct. “Imminent”
under Del Lago was considered to be ninety minutes before a melee
broke out.319 Therefore, the majority held there was no proven duty
based on the superseding criminal activity.320
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Hassan concluded that the majority
failed to utilize the “risk-utility test” to balance risk, foreseeability, likeli-
hood against social utility, the magnitude of the burden, and conse-
quences of the burden denied.321 Evidence was presented that showed
that the festival owners actually foresaw the chances of a vehicle-pedes-
309. Id. at 786.
310. Id. at 784.
311. Id. at 784–85.
312. Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex. 1998).
313. Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 769 (Tex. 2010).
314. Nguyen, 580 S.W.3d at 785.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 789.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 791.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 793–95 (Hassan, J., dissenting).
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trian collision.322 The dissent can be summarized in its statement: “I re-
ject the majority’s novel conclusion that victims of third-party criminal
car chases are precluded from prevailing in negligence actions where sim-
ilarly-situated victims of third-party negligence can succeed (e.g., non-
criminal conduct of drivers in medical distress or mechanical failure of
vehicles).”323
3. Ferae Naturae—Artificial Structure
Hillis v. McCall324 involved a premises liability case dealing with the
doctrine of ferae naturae. The case involved a brown recluse spider bite
and whether the landowner owed a duty to the invitee.325 Hillis owned a
bed and breakfast (B&B) premises in Fredericksburg, Texas, and McCall
rented a small cabin behind the B&B but occasionally performed work
for Hillis at the B&B.326 Both Hillis and McCall were aware of spiders
occasionally in the B&B, but neither had specific knowledge of the exis-
tence of brown recluse or other venomous spiders. While McCall was in
the B&B fixing a leaking sink, he was bitten by a brown recluse spider; he
brought suit against Hillis claiming Hillis owed him a duty of notice and
failed to give notice.327
The trial court granted summary judgment for Hillis, but the Fourth
San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed and held that Hillis had failed to
establish the absence of a duty to warn or make safe under the doctrine
of ferae naturae.328 The appellate court noted that Hillis admitted knowl-
edge of the brown recluse spider population in his deposition, but the
Texas Supreme Court found no such deposition testimony.329 This fact
was material in the supreme court’s decision to reverse and render
judgment.
The general rule for an invitee, and the duty owed by the premises
owner to the invitee,330 is that “the landowner owes a ‘duty to make safe
or warn against any concealed, unreasonably dangerous conditions of
which the landowner is, or reasonably should be aware, but the invitee is
not.’”331 By corollary, no duty is owed by the landowner when the invitee
knows of the condition or the condition is obvious to the invitee.332 With
respect to indigenous wild animals, the law generally provides that both
the premises owner and invitee have similar knowledge and duties.333
322. Id. at 793–94.
323. Id. at 794.
324. 602 S.W.3d 436, 436 (Tex. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 880 (2020).
325. Id. at 438.
326. Id. at 439.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 439 n.4.
330. A person is an invitee when he enters the third party’s property for the mutual
benefit of both the person and the property owner. Id. at 440 n.6 (citing Rosas v. Buddies
Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. 1975)).
331. Id. at 440 (citing Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193, 203 (Tex. 2015)).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 441.
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The only exception to this is when the property owner thinks the wild
animals under his possession are controlled, has introduced non-indige-
nous wild animals, or has affirmatively attracted wild animals to his prop-
erty.334 Subsequent case law has added an additional exception to the
ferae naturae doctrine when the indigenous wild animals were found in an
“artificial structure,” but only if the landowner knew or should have
known of an unreasonable risk of harm to the invitee.335 Because the
facts showed that neither Hillis nor McCall knew of the actual presence
of brown recluse spiders (also holding that the existence of harmless spi-
ders did not equate to a knowledge of the existence of venomous spi-
ders),336 and there was no other evidence (such as customer reviews) of
the existence of venomous spiders; there was no duty owed as a matter of
law.337
B. ENTITIES
1. Piercing the Corporate Veil
In Durham v. Accardi,338 Durham, who was injured while performing a
job function, sued the principals of his employer seeking to pierce the
corporate veil. The trial court ordered summary judgment in favor of Ac-
cardi, the principal of the employer. The Fourteenth Houston Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling because Durham failed to pro-
vide evidence sufficient to support the alter ego/piercing the corporate
veil theory.339 In analyzing the evidence presented, the concept of “total
dealings” between the corporation and the individual had to be consid-
ered.340 The evidence which supports such a theory includes: (1) payment
of corporate debts with personal funds or the comingling of corporate
and personal funds; (2) representations that the individual will financially
back the entity; (3) conversion of entity profits to the individual’s use; (4)
inadequate capitalization; (5) failure to keep separate the assets of the
entity and the individual; (6) degree of adherence to corporate formali-
ties; (7) degree and amount of financial interest; (8) ownership and con-
trol by the individual over the entity; and (9) use of the entity for
personal purposes.341
In the subject case, Durham relied exclusively on inadequate capitaliza-
tion and failure to follow corporate formalities.342 In response, Accardi
argued that Durham had failed to present evidence of (1) the comingling
of the individual and business assets; (2) the financial interest, ownership,
or control by a party over the entity; (3) the use by Accardi of the entity
334. Id. (citing Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Nami, 498 S.W.3d 890, 897 (Tex. 2016)).
335. Id. (citing Nami, 498 S.W.3d at 897).
336. Id. at 443.
337. Id.
338. 587 S.W.3d 179, 179 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
339. Id. at 186.
340. Id. at 185.
341. Id. at 185–86.
342. Id.
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for individual purposes; (4) the payment of corporate debts with personal
funds; (5) the representations of financial backing; and (6) that the profits
were diverted from the entity to the individual.343 As to the corporate
formality requirements, Durham relied on Accardi’s deposition testi-
mony that the entity did not “do formal stuff” indicated a general lack of
knowledge on corporate formalities.344 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that failure to observe corporate formalities was no longer a controlling
factor in considering whether the corporate veil can be pierced under the
Texas Business Organizations Code.345 On the undercapitalization the-
ory, Durham cited evidence of the entity’s failure to carry workers’ com-
pensation, or other insurance which would have covered his injuries, and
testimony from Accardi that the entity had more liabilities than assets.
But such evidence was insufficient to support the undercapitalization
theory.346
Sustaining an alter ego theory required evidence on more than just a
few of the suggested factual scenarios. Durham’s failure to offer evidence
of the comingling of properties; Accardi’s financial interest, ownership
and control over the entity; payment of corporate debts with personal
funds; representations of financial backing; and the diversion of entity
funds for personal use, did not satisfy the totality of the factors.347
2. Dueling Venues Provisions
Different venue provisions were the subject of the Texas Supreme
Court’s opinion in In re Fox River Real Estate Holdings, Inc.348 Suit for
wrongful disposition of a partnership’s assets was initiated by Fox River,
a limited partner, against the general partner, Metropolitan Water Com-
pany of Texas.349 Fox River alleged that Metropolitan Water usurped as-
sets of the partnership by disposing of groundwater leases, which
otherwise would have been sold to central Texas municipalities.
Pursuant to the injunction venue statute,350 suit was filed in Washing-
ton County, the domicile of Metropolitan Water. However, Metropolitan
Water moved to transfer venue to Harris County pursuant to the limited
partnership agreement351 and the “major transaction” mandatory venue
statute.352 Metropolitan Water characterized the mandatory venue provi-
sion as a super-priority provision. But an exception to the mandatory
venue provisions of § 15.020 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
343. Id. at 186.
344. Id.
345. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a)(3)).
346. Id.
347. Id. at 187.
348. 596 S.W.3d 759, 759 (Tex. 2020).
349. Id. at 761.
350. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.023(a).
351. In re Fox River, 596 S.W.3d at 762 n.3. Section 12.06 of the partnership agreement
provided: “[t]he proper venue for resolution of any dispute related to this Agreement is
only in Harris County, Texas.” Id.
352. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.020.
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Code is contained in § 15.020(d), which overrides the super-priority na-
ture thereof if venue is established by another statute other than Title II
(which includes the mandatory venue provisions but not the injunction
provisions).353 Because the injunction venue section resided in Title III
and not Title II of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, the injunc-
tion venue should prevail. However, the supreme court looked to the
commonsense meanings of the pleadings from Fox River and concluded
that the pleadings were not “purely or primarily injunctive,”354 but rather
related to the removal of Metropolitan Water as a partner and recovery
of monetary damages.355 Therefore, the venue was effective as a major
transaction under the mandatory venue statute.356 The supreme court fur-
ther stated that although this statute was preemptory as to all other venue
provisions, it was not a “super mandatory” venue provision that would
apply in the face of a validly presented injunction venue suit.357
3. Partnership Formation
Energy Transfer Partners, LP v. Enterprise Products Partners, LP358
involved a case of first impression as to whether a condition precedent to
the formation of a partnership prevails over statutory provisions. Energy
Transfer Partners, LP (ETP) and Enterprise Products Partners, LP (En-
terprise), both large United States energy companies, entered into a num-
ber of agreements (a Confidentiality Agreement, a Letter Agreement,
and a Reimbursement Agreement). Each indicated that the parties were
not obligated to form a partnership to pursue the development of a pipe-
line running south from Cushing, Oklahoma to the Gulf Coast until cer-
tain conditions precedent had been met.359 Those conditions precedent
were a definitive executed agreement and board approval from each
party. Ultimately, Enterprise withdrew and began negotiating with a third
party, ConocoPhillips. ETP sued Enterprise claiming a partnership was
formed and Enterprise had breached it by working with
ConocoPhillips.360
In reviewing the issues, the Texas Supreme Court noted that longstand-
ing Texas common law and statutes required five factors to create a part-
nership: (1) an agreement to share profits; (2) expression of intent to be
partners; (3) participation in control of the business; (4) agreement for
sharing of losses and liabilities; and (5) contribution of money or prop-
erty.361 Further, none of these factors were controlling, but should be
considered in a “totality-of-the-circumstances test.”362 The statutory pro-
353. See id.
354. In re Fox River, 596 S.W.3d at 765.
355. Id. at 768.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. 593 S.W.3d 732, 732 (Tex. 2020).
359. Id. at 734.
360. Id. at 736.
361. Id. at 737.
362. Id.
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vision, Texas Business Organizations Code § 152.003, allowed the consid-
eration of other “principles of law and equity” in the analysis of whether
a partnership was formed, which the supreme court held to include the
longstanding and recognized public policy favoring freedom of
contract.363
In determining whether the contractual conditions precedent could
override the statutory test, the supreme court distinguished two prior
cases: Coastal Plains Development Corp. v. Micrea, Inc.364 and Root v.
Tomberlin.365 In Coastal Plains, the Texas Supreme Court determined the
intent of the parties will not control over a different status determination
from that stated in the contract;366 in Root, where condition precedents
suggested no formation of a partnership, the Eighth El Paso Court of
Appeals’ determination was actually made on the basis that there was no
sharing of profits.367
In further support of its opinion, the supreme court construed Texas
Business Organizations Code § 152.003 to authorize the supplementation
of the partnership formation rules.368 Therefore, the supplementation in-
cluded Texas’s freedom of contract principle, allowing the parties to con-
tract for conditions precedent to the formation of a partnership.369
4. Derivative Litigation
In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd.370 is a mandamus case to the Texas Su-
preme Court regarding the trial court’s denial of a motion to disqualify
the law firm representing one of two competing ownership groups (the
Murrin Group and the Hickman Group) with respect to the management
of the world’s largest honky-tonk, Billy Bob’s, in the Fort Worth Stock-
yards. The Hickman Group attempted to relieve Minnick of management
authority over Billy Bob’s, which was opposed by the Murrin Group. Al-
though the Hickman Group had the majority of the ownership entity’s
(Billy Bob’s Texas Investments (BBT)) board of managers and a majority
of the ownership interest, the operating agreement of BBT required una-
nimity on “major decisions.” These “major decisions” included “settling,
prosecuting, defending or initiating any lawsuit, administrative or similar
actions concerning or affecting the business of BBT” or its properties.371
The Murrin Group filed suit both individually and derivatively on behalf
of BBT. The Hickman Group hired a law firm to represent the Hickman
Group individually and on behalf of BBT, which was the same law firm
that had previously represented the BBT entity prior to the suit. After a
363. Id. at 738.
364. 572 S.W.2d 285, 285 (Tex. 1978).
365. 36 S.W.2d 596, 596 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1931, writ ref’d).
366. Energy Transfer, 593 S.W.3d at 739.
367. Id. at 739–40.
368. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.051(b).
369. Energy Transfer, 593 S.W.3d at 740.
370. 603 S.W.3d 53, 53 (Tex. 2019).
371. Id. at 55.
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couple of years of litigation activity—and three months before trial—the
Murrin Group filed a motion to disqualify the Hickman Group’s law firm
counsel. This motion was denied, the Second Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, and the supreme court considered whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the disqualification motion.372
The important legal point discussed by the supreme court related to the
characterization of the company as either a plaintiff or a defendant in a
shareholder derivative action.373 The supreme court noted that in share-
holder derivative actions, the company is often noted as a plaintiff, a
nominal defendant, or both.374 Concluding that companies in derivative
actions are both simultaneously the plaintiff and the defendant, the su-
preme court took the position that the appropriate inquiry was whether
the lawyer is required to take conflicting positions, or a position that risks
harming one of the attorney’s clients.375 The supreme court found differ-
ences in other jurisdictions’ approaches to this issue, noting distinctions
between California376 and Delaware.377
After consideration of these positions, the supreme court held “[w]e
announce no categorical rule governing dual representation in derivative
litigation. Whether a company and the individual defendants are ‘oppos-
ing parties’ . . . requires consideration of the true extent of their adversity
under the circumstances.”378 The supreme court held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the disqualification motion, noting
the legislative acknowledgement of control fights with a statute allowing
derivative proceedings to be brought by a member for its own benefit as
opposed to derivatively, if justice so requires.379 Further, the supreme
court found that there was no showing that the law firm possessed confi-
dential information belonging to the Murrin Group, the disqualification
motion was brought too late in the litigation process, rejecting the Murrin
Group’s argument would irrevocably prejudice the jury, and that jury in-
structions or other parameters would have helped level the playing
field.380 In conclusion, the supreme court made this statement (one of the
authors’ favorite judicial comments):
Gone are the days when a family feud over a dance hall and saloon
in the Fort Worth Stockyards would be solved by six-shooters. These
days, we use lawyers instead of lead. Thank goodness for that. As
complicated, expensive, and frustrating as litigation can be, it sure
beats a shootout at the stockyards.381
372. Id.
373. Id. at 58.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1188–89 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
377. See Respler ex rel. Magnum Hunter Res. Corp. v. Evans, 17 F. Supp. 3d 418, 421
(D. Del. 2014).
378. In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd., 603 S.W.3d at 59.
379. Id. at 60 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.463c(c)).
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C. INSURANCE
1. Appraisal Awards
This year’s Survey period covered two important cases dealing with al-
legations of an insurer’s breach of contract based on the initial estimate
of damages being less than the amount of damages ultimately determined
by an appraisal award issued pursuant to the insurance policy’s appraisal
provisions, even when the appraisal provision was elected after com-
mencement of a breach of contract suit against the insurer.
In Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds,382 the Texas Supreme Court agreed that
“an insurer’s payment of an appraisal award in the face of similar allega-
tions of pre-appraisal underpayment forecloses liability on a breach of
contract claim.”383 Furthermore, as to an insured’s bad faith claim for
adjusting a loss, the supreme court confirmed appellate court cases hold-
ing that the discrepancy between an initial estimate and an appraisal
award amount did not constitute intentional under-valuation of the claim,
absent evidence of an independent injury.384 But, as to the insured’s
claim under the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (TPPCA), the su-
preme court stated that the “insurer’s payment of an appraisal award
does not as a matter of law bar an insured’s claims under the
[TPPCA].”385
Barbara Technologies Corp. v. State Farm Lloyds386 is the seminal case
addressing the issue of liability for damages for delayed payments under
the TPPCA. In this case, a wind hailstorm caused damage to Barbara
Technologies’ commercial property on March 31, 2013. Barbara Technol-
ogies filed a claim with State Farm on October 17, 2013, which was denied
on November 4, 2013, because State Farm’s assessment of damages was
less than the deductible under the policy.387 A request for a second in-
spection resulted in no change; therefore, Barbara Technologies filed suit
on July 14, 2014. State Farm invoked the policy appraisal provisions on
January 9, 2015. The final agreed appraised value of $195,000.00 was de-
termined on August 18, 2015, received by State Farm on August 19, 2015,
and paid on August 25, 2015. Barbara Technologies alleged that State
Farm violated the TPPCA by not paying within the sixty-day statutorily
required time limit.388 In defense, State Farm asserted that such a claim
was not available after State Farm had paid the appraisal award
amount.389
Upon appeal from summary judgment motions, the Texas Supreme
Court considered the interplay between the TPPCA and the policy’s ap-
382. 589 S.W.3d 127, 127 (Tex. 2019).
383. Id. at 132.
384. Id. at 134.
385. Id. at 135.
386. 589 S.W.3d 806, 806 (Tex. 2019).
387. Id. at 809.
388. Id. at 815.
389. Id.
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praisal provisions, found that the TPPCA did not address the appraisal
process, and concluded that the TPPCA contained neither deadlines for
the appraisal process nor exemption of the appraisal process from the
TPPCA deadlines.390 The supreme court specifically disapproved of prior
cases that excused an insurer from prompt payment liability because it
paid an appraisal award.391 The TPPCA does not impose liability upon
invocation of the appraisal process, but it does impose liability after the
insurer accepts liability or is otherwise adjudicated liable on the claim;
however, payment of a claim does not, by itself, establish the liability ele-
ment.392 In other words, an appraisal award establishes only the amount
of the damages, not liability under the policy. The conclusion, as stated by
the supreme court, was “that invocation of the contractual appraisal pro-
vision . . . neither subjects an insurer to TPPCA damages nor insulates the
insurer from TPPCA damages.”393
In a dissent, Justice Boyd concluded that the voluntary and uncondi-
tional payment of the appraisal award was a concession of liability and
claim amount by the insurer.394 An additional dissent by Chief Justice
Hecht and Justices Brown and Blacklock characterized the majority as
ignoring several Texas appellate courts, the Fifth Circuit, and U.S. Dis-
trict Courts for all four Texas districts, and the absence of changes to such
provisions holding that payment of an appraisal award avoids penalty lia-
bility under the TPPCA.395 Based on the split decision in Barbara Tech-
nologies, practitioners must wonder what changes may occur with a
change in the composition of the Texas Supreme Court.
2. Prompt Payment
Biasatti v. GuideOne National Insurance Co.396 involved a claim under
the TPPCA. The insurance company estimated the plaintiff’s property
damage was under the $5,000.00 deductible amount. The insurance com-
pany had this reappraised a second time but refused a third appraisal.
Therefore, the property owner filed suit and the insurer asserted the “uni-
lateral appraisal clause.”397 The unilateral appraisal clause basically pro-
vided that the “[insurer] can demand that the amount of loss be set by
appraisal.”398 The ultimate award asserted liability against the insurer
under the TPPCA. This case was filed after the Texas Supreme Court had
issued its opinions in Barbara Technologies and Ortiz, but neither of
those cases addressed the liability issue in the TPPCA claim because of
the unilateral appraisal clause. The supreme court acknowledged that the
390. Id. at 824–26.
391. Id. at 819.
392. Id. at 827.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 829 (Boyd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
395. Id. at 844–45 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
396. 601 S.W.3d 792, 792 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).
397. Id. at 793.
398. Id. at 793 n.1.
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unilateral appraisal was still undecided and remanded the case to the trial
court to consider the claims based on the unilateral appraisal clause.399
3. Takings for Public Use
KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett,400 the Texas progeny of
Kelo v. City of New London,401 addressed the applicable Takings Clause
under the state constitution. Here, KMS Retail Rowlett, LP (KMS)
owned a commercial tract of land with retail establishments fronting
Lakeview Parkway, but with a private access road along the rear of the
property paralleling Lakeview Parkway and connecting with the street on
the western boundary, Kenwood Drive. The property to the east was
owned by Briarwood, which was negotiating with Sprouts Farmers Mar-
ket for a grocery store on its tract. Desperate to attract Sprouts to its
community, the city entered into an economic development agreement
with Briarwood to facilitate leasing the site to Sprouts.402 Sprouts’s lease
required access westward to Kenwood Drive along the private road or a
significant reduction in rent would result. Briarwood attempted to negoti-
ate access rights to connect with KMS’s existing private road, but such
negotiations proved fruitless. Condemnation proceedings were com-
menced by the city and a motion for summary judgment was rendered
against KMS and in favor of the city, to which an appeal was taken. The
Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the city. Review was
granted, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the decision.403
At issue was whether (1) the recent Texas statute limiting public use
condemnation404 was applicable to such taking, and (2) the taking was
appropriate under the Takings Clause of the Texas constitution.405 These
constitutional and statutory provisions provided the framework for a law-
ful condemnation, which required a public use and that the taking be nec-
essary for a public use. Both the constitutional and statutory taking
provisions were affected in 2005 by the United States Supreme Court’s
opinion in Kelo, which held that a city could condemn a private home as
part of an economic redevelopment plan that would turn over the taken
land to a private business.406 In response to the Kelo case, the Texas legis-
lature, in a special called session, adopted a more limited condemnation
statute.407 That statute prohibited takings (1) that confer a private benefit
on a private party; (2) for a public use that is merely a pretext to confer a
private benefit to a particular private party; (3) for economic develop-
ment purposes; or (4) not for a public use.408 However, there was an ex-
399. Id. at 795.
400. 593 S.W.3d 175, 175 (Tex. 2019), reh’g denied (Oct. 4, 2019).
401. 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005).
402. KMS Retail Rowlett, LP, 593 S.W.3d at 179.
403. Id. at 194.
404. TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 2206.001.
405. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
406. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489–90.
407. KMS Retail, 593 S.W.3d at 181–82.
408. Id. at 182.
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ception to such prohibition that authorized the taking of private property
for transportation projects, including public roads.409
First, the supreme court analyzed the statutory provision and deter-
mined that the transportation exception overruled the prohibitions in the
statute “ulterior motives notwithstanding.”410 The supreme court relied
on City of Austin v. Whittington411 in finding that there was no statutory
language “on which to add an exception to the application of [the trans-
portation exceptions to the prohibitions] if a transportation project is ille-
gitimate.”412 The essence of the supreme court’s opinion was summed up
as follows:
[a]ccordingly, if a taking is for a transportation project, the con-
demnor is constrained only by the statutory provisions that grant it
condemnation authority (and any other relevant statutes) and the
limitations imposed by the constitution and our case law. The con-
demnor is free of the additional limitations imposed by section
2206.001(b).413
In furtherance of such position, KMS argued that the subject taking
was not a “transportation project” for a “public road.” In support of its
non-transportation argument, KMS relied upon definitions in the Re-
gional Mobility Authority Act.414 Those provisions were distinguished by
the supreme court as relating to a different purpose than for the statutory
takings prohibitions exemption.415 Also, KMS argued that the private
road did not meet the width standards in the city’s Master Thoroughfare
Plan. But the supreme court found that the common meaning of public
road would override any local municipality’s standard for a road and re-
lied upon the city council’s resolution authorizing the need for the acqui-
sition of the private roadway of KMS.416
Next, the supreme court turned to a constitutional analysis of public
use. Under the Texas constitution, a taking is authorized for just compen-
sation only when there is a public use.417 Considering what a public use
included, the supreme court noted that the public must derive “some def-
inite right or use in” the property taken, and that “[i]t is immaterial if the
use is limited to the citizens of a local neighborhood . . . so long as it is
open to all” other citizens.418 Also, the supreme court noted that the de-
termination of a public use was a legislative decision, to which the courts
should give deference.419 This deference for determination of public use
by a governmental authority can be overturned only by judicial review
409. TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 2206.001(c)(1).
410. KMS Retail, 593 S.W.3d at 183.
411. 384 S.W.3d 766, 766 (Tex. 2012).
412. KMS Retail, 593 S.W.3d at 183.
413. Id. at 184.
414. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 370.003.
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416. Id. at 186.
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when the decision “was fraudulent, in bad faith, or arbitrary and
capricious.”420
Public use was involved in this taking because: (1) the city council reso-
lutions stated its necessity; (2) a city staff report indicated such a road
would serve a public purpose, provide better circulation between retail
locations, reduced traffic flow on the main artery (Lakeview Parkway),
and provide emergency vehicle access to first responders; and (3) the tes-
timony of the director of economic development stated the necessity of
the access easement between the adjoining properties.421 There was no
evidence submitted by KMS that negated any of such public purposes.
Much of KMS’s defense relied upon what it alleged were the improper
motivations of the city; however, the supreme court refused to consider
the ulterior motive of the city when a facially valid public use was
presented.422 Any issues as to fraudulent activity had to be addressed sep-
arately under the judicial exclusions for constitutionality of takings by
means of fraud, bad faith, or arbitrary or any capricious action.423
Consequently, the supreme court considered the potential fraudulent
actions of the city. First, the supreme court defined fraud in the condem-
nation context. It was wrongly defined by the appellate court, which used
the typical common law fraud definition. In the context of a condemna-
tion case, fraud existed when “contrary to the ostensible public use, the
taking would actually confer only a private benefit.”424 In other words,
the taking of property for a public use can be fraudulent even if there was
not fraudulent intent on the part of the condemnor, if the public use is
only a guise for private use. KMS alleged that the city’s ulterior motive
was to provide an economic benefit to Briarwood, Sprouts, or both.425
However, the city was considering condemnation before Briarwood was
unable to negotiate an easement because the Sprouts deal would not have
been consummated without an easement, and there was no evidence ne-
gating a need for traffic relief or emergency vehicle access. The supreme
court determined that the economic incentive did “not negate any of the
city’s ostensible public uses justifying the taking.”426 Consequently, the
motive behind the taking, as long as it provided a public use, and not
solely a private benefit, would not be questioned.427 KMS argued that
there was quid pro quo between the city and Briarwood evidenced by a
letter amendment to the economic development agreement that reduced
the payments the city would make to Briarwood by the costs incurred in
connection with the condemnation process.428 But this was viewed as
420. Id. at 184 (citing City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex. 2012)).
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nothing more than favorable negotiations. Further, the supreme court re-
fused to read “nefarious motives” into deferring condemnation until after
private negotiations failed and reducing the economic benefits by its costs
of condemnation.429 Practitioners should consider the daunting task of
proving that no public use could ever be established for any particular
taking.
There was a rather powerful dissent by three justices, making this opin-
ion a 6–3 decision. The dissent focused on the deference to governmental
body decisions, and argued for (1) the overruling of existing precedent
because of the 2009 amendment to the Texas constitution;430 (2) eliminat-
ing deference to governmental declarations of public use; and (3) shifting
the burden of proof to the government.431 The dissenters believed that
current judicial precedents were not based upon the current Texas consti-
tution; they were based upon principles developed under the pre-2009
amendments to the Texas Takings Clause.432 Such amendments, in re-
sponse to Kelo, reflected the Texas limitation of governmental taking
powers and a new line of reasoning should be developed based upon such
amendments requiring ownership, use, and enjoyment by the public as a
whole.
As to its deference position, the dissent urged the supreme court to
continue to move away from the undue deferential authority given gov-
ernmental entities, asserting that “‘[u]nadorned assertions of public use
are constitutionally insufficient’ in determining whether a use will ‘in fact
be public rather than private.’”433 The dissent quoted favorably from the
Kelo dissent of Justice O’Connor, claiming that “no coherent principle
limits what could constitute a valid public use.”434 Also, the dissent
delved into the murky distinction between a “public use” and a “public
purpose,” noting that the current Texas constitution’s “public use” re-
quirement had always required that the property taken must be used for
ownership, use, or enjoyment by the government or public at large.435
The dissent also complained that limiting a property owner’s constitu-
tional defenses to fraud, bad faith, and arbitrariness was confusing and
had no precedent for excluding other defenses.436 Consequently, the dis-
sent would shift the burden of proof to the government to prove it had a
legitimate public use purpose as a condition to the condemnation.437
Moreover, to further confuse practitioners, the majority opinion ad-
dressing the dissent, noted the persuasive comments as to reconsideration
of the changes in judicial interpretation after the 2009 constitutional
429. Id.
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amendments and the prior public use jurisprudence, and stated that the
majority “would welcome the opportunity to further explore [the dis-
sent’s] position in a future case in which the issue is directly
presented.”438 Based on KMS Retail, practitioners should realize that the
saga will continue on how public use condemnations will be governed.
X. CONCLUSION
The most impactful authority during this Survey period was the infor-
mal guidance from the Texas Attorney General, which virtually stopped
all foreclosures in their tracks; future litigation over foreclosures that pro-
ceeded in the face of such letter will undoubtedly be a topic in future
survey articles. But looking forward, the KMS Retail ruling may be the
most impactful, especially if the Texas Supreme Court follows through in
its “promise” to reconsider the requirements in a taking of private
property.
Based on the oil patch dual in the Energy Transfer Partners case, prac-
titioners now have clear approval to draft contractual conditions prece-
dent to the formation of a partnership which will supersede the statutory
requirements in Texas Business Organizations Code § 152.003. As always,
drafting precision will still be paramount, as evidenced by the unartful
description of collateral in Cheniere, and the conflict caused by subse-
quent loan statements reflecting the full balance due after a purported
abandonment of acceleration in the Pitts decision. The Texas Supreme
Court gave additional drafting advice in Rahlek and Mercedes-Benz. Two
additional cases, Chalker and Copano, provided essential guidance to
practitioners on how to conduct negotiations via email.
For comfort to practitioners, in Zepeda, the Texas Supreme Court put
to bed any doubt that longstanding equitable subrogation rights would
prevail under the new constitutional home equity lending regime. Practi-
tioners can also take comfort in the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in
Southwestern Electric Power which reaffirmed Texas courts’ historical
treatment of upholding blanket easements.
438. Id. at 194.
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